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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the possibility of influencing the gender difference in 
risk-taking behavior. By doing so, we combine research from two different fields, namely 
literature on gender differences in risk-taking behavior, and the literature on default effects. We 
wish to contribute to the research in the intersection between these two fields.  
 
The question in focus is examined by gathering primary data through an incentivized economic 
experiment posted on the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. The 360 participants that 
contributed to our study were exposed to one of two treatment variations. Half the participants 
were initially given a default option encouraging risk seeking behavior, while the other half were 
given a default encouraging risk averse behavior. A randomized experiment enabled us to 
examine the causal relationship between the risk-taking behavior of the participants and the 
treatment they received.  
 
In accordance with previous research and our expectations, our findings indicate greater risk 
aversion among females compared to males. Furthermore, we find evidence of a treatment effect, 
meaning that people receiving the risky option as default, are exhibiting more risk seeking 
behavior. Our most interesting result is found when interacting the treatment effect with gender. 
When dividing our sample by gender, we find a significant treatment effect among females, and 
no evidence of a treatment effect among males. This implies that only females seem to be affected 
by a default bias, while males are equally risk seeking irrespective of the default option. 
 
In addition to the main analysis, we performed a short analysis of the influence of time preference 
on the tendency to stick with the default option, as we found this relationship interesting. Our 
findings imply that impatient individuals are significantly more influenced by the default effect 
than patient ones.  
 
The result of our study substantiates the possibility of affecting the gender gap in risk-taking 
behavior by changing the default option of a choice. By framing the choice with the risky option 
as default, the gender gap disappears. This is interesting from a policy perspective, since it 
provides a different interpretation of the drivers of gender differences in risk-taking behavior.  It 
suggests that the gender difference is not only an expression of underlying risk preferences. 
Rather, it might be a result of the combination of a stronger default bias among females, and that 
the safe alternative often is the default in many decisions that we meet in everyday life.  
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1. Introduction and background 
 
Risk fundamentally affects individual behavior and plays a crucial role in almost every 
important economic decision and numerous other non-economic decisions. Your risk 
preferences will affect several aspects of your daily life. It can influence everything from what 
kind of career you chose, to your propensity to drink alcohol or take drugs. Being more 
inclined to take risk is, in particular contexts, found to be associated with greater personal and 
corporate success (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990).   
 
It is well documented from economic experiments that most people are risk averse (Arrow, 
1965; Pratt, 1964; Ross, 1981; Yates and Stone, 1992). Furthermore, research points towards 
females being more risk averse than males across different domains and contexts. These 
findings imply that there exists a gender gap in risk-taking behavior. The literature on default 
effects, including the more resent and increasingly popular theory on nudges, have proven that 
the influences of a default effect has considerable influences on people’s choices and 
behavior. These results are consistent in settings ranging from insurance, investment and 
marketing to organ donations and health care (Johnson et al., 2012; Sunstein, 2014). The 
tendency of people to presume gains and losses relative to a reference point or the status quo 
can be seen as the mechanism behind the default effect.  
 
In this master thesis we take a closer look at the default effect, how it works and who it 
influences, and combine this with the findings from the research on risk-taking behavior. We 
have built upon existing research to formulate a hypothesis about what we expect to find. The 
effects of a default on the gender difference in risk-taking behavior were tested by designing 
and executing an online economic experiment which provided primary data. Primary data 
gives control over both the data obtained from the respondents and the sample structure. This 
increases confidence that the data will match the objectives of the study (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Jackson, 2008).  
 
To be able to measure risk-taking in the most realistic and reliable way, we made use of an 
incentivized experiment with real money at stake. This is the prevalent way of measuring risk-
taking behavior in today’s research, and strengthens the validity of our results. The sample, 
consisting of 360 participants, where randomly assigned to one of two treatment variations. 
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Thereafter, they were given the task intended to reveal their risk-taking behavior. This task 
was a choice between a risky payment option (a lottery) and a safe payment option (a certain/ 
fixed amount of money). One treatment group was given the risky option as default, whereas 
the other group was given the safe option as default.  
 
Our main finding is that females and males respond differently to the treatment. In the 
treatment group with the safe default, a greater share of women than men chose the safe 
option. This is consistent with previous findings claiming that women exhibit more risk 
averse behavior. However, in the treatment group with the risky default, the gender 
differences in risk-taking is neutralized, meaning that the same amount of women and men 
choose the risky option. Men seem to be unaffected by the default effects as there were no 
differences in risk-taking across treatments.  
 
The findings indicate that female risk-taking is affected by the default option, whereas the 
risk-taking of males is unaffected by the same effect. Hence, it might seem like the gender 
differences in risk-taking behavior is more a question of loss aversion and reference 
dependence (default effect), than a question of underlying preferences for risk. It is possible 
that women are not more risk averse than men, but possess a stronger default bias. This is a 
plausible interpretation if most choices, in general, are framed with a safe default rather than 
with a risky default. Consequently, our study emphasizes the importance of considering the 
framing of choices. 
 
Several studies have looked into differences in risk-taking when it comes to the framing of 
choices. However, the research on gender differences in default bias is very limited. Our study 
contributes to this literature and to the understanding of gender differences in risk-taking 
behavior by documenting a strong relationship between the default effect and female’s 
propensity to take risk.     
 
Furthermore, we performed a brief additional analysis to investigate the relationship between 
the default effect and people’s time preferences. During our analysis we found this variable 
particularly interesting as the treatment effect seemed to be partly explained by time 
preference rather than gender. Further analysis revealed two main findings related to time 
preference. Firstly, we found impatient individuals to be much more risk averse than patient 
ones, significant at the 99 % level. Secondly, we found impatient individuals to be more 
affected by the default option than patient ones, significant at the 90 % level.  
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1.1 Background and motivation  
 
The topic of this thesis started as an interest in why there are less female leaders than male 
leaders. There exist several hypotheses seeking to explain this phenomenon. One being that 
women are still not given the same opportunities as men, rooted in a history of gender 
inequality. Another states that women are kept out of top management because they will be 
absent in periods when they are having children; thus making men appear a safer choice due 
to continuous availability. It has also been argued that women are less inclined to make career 
sacrifices origin from a higher sensitivity to work-family conflicts (Gneezy, Leonard and List, 
2009).  
 
Several studies in the experimental economics literature have suggested that men are more 
competitively inclined than women (e.g. Almås, Cappelen, Salvanes, Sørensen and 
Tungodden, 2012; Gneezy et al., 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Schurchkov, 2012). 
Another explanation put forward by Schurchkov (2012) is that gender differences in skills and 
preferences lead to occupational self-selection. Yet another one is that women are choosing 
other careers because a career in top management involves significant risk. Such a career 
comes with a large responsibility and consequently a large risk of making bad decisions and 
mistakes. The potential fall is much larger from the “top of the ladder”.   
 
The hypothesis that women are more risk averse than men has been put forward as a major 
cause behind the “glass ceiling” (Johnson and Powell, 1994). The “glass ceiling” can be 
described as “the unseen, yet unbreakable barrier that keeps minorities and women from 
rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or 
achievements” (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995, p. 4). Some argue that women will 
not make the risky decisions that might be necessary for a business to succeed (Schubert, 
Brown, Gysler and Branchinger, 1999). Eckel and Grossman (2008, p. 2) provides a 
description of the importance of risk preferences: 
 
Whether men and women systematically differ in their responses to risk is an important 
economic question. If women are more sensitive to risk than men, this will be reflected in 
all aspects of their decision making, including choice of profession (and so earnings), 
investment decisions, and what products to buy.   
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In addition to the potential relationship between risk-taking behavior and female under-
representation in top management positions, risk-taking is important in several other aspects 
of business. Risk preferences can be decisive when firms are hiring, or in other situations 
where people might be selected based on their risk preferences. For instance, startup 
companies may be looking for risk seeking employees when expanding, and investment 
managers might need the right risk preferences to be assigned to important clients (Weber, 
Blais and Betz, 2002). There has also been a debate whether risk averseness cause fewer 
women to become entrepreneurs. Several studies find that women are less likely to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities than men (e.g. Zeffane, 2013). 
 
1.2 Research question and structure of the thesis 
 
We wish to look into the gender differences in risk-taking behavior. At the same time, we 
want to investigate whether risk-taking behavior could be influenced by a small change in the 
formulation of a question. The focus of our study will be on the simultaneous influence of 
these two effects. The aim is to reveal the potential relationship between gender differences in 
risk-taking and gender differences in default effects. We define our research question in the 
following way:  
 
Research question: What are the effects of a default option on the difference in risk-taking 
behavior among men and women? 
 
The thesis is structured in five main chapters. The first chapter is the introduction where we 
explain the motivation and background for the study. The second chapter provides a literature 
review, where we examine the existing literature in the relevant fields, to understand what is 
known and what is not known about our chosen topic. At the end of chapter two we develop a 
hypothesis to our research question based on existing theories and previous research. Chapter 
three presents the method used for investigating our research question. This chapter offers a 
description of how our research was conducted and justifies the methods used and the choices 
made. Chapter four presents the findings and results of our study. We made use of statistical 
tests to analyze the data in order to answer our research question. In the fifth and last chapter, 
a brief summary of our study is offered and we discuss our findings and their implications. At 
the end of this chapter, we present some suggestions for future research, and conclude our 
study.  
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2. Literature review  
 
In this section, we present a review of the relevant theories, concepts and empirical studies in 
the current literature on behavioral economics. This will provide an overview and 
understanding of the most important knowledge and also the latest findings in the field. 
Existing research will help us formulate a hypothesis to our research question, which is 
proposed at the end of the literature review. The review is structured in three main parts. First, 
we present the relevant literature and findings to understand risk-taking behavior and gender 
differences in risk taking. Thereafter, we describe the concepts of reference dependent 
preferences and loss aversion, within the prospect theory framework. Finally, we present our 
hypothesis.  
 
2.1 Risk-taking behavior and gender differences  
 
The study of risk-taking behavior is a multidisciplinary exercise. Definitions of risk and risk-
taking depends on the field of study and varies between economics, management sciences, 
psychology, anthropology and sociology (Shapira, 1995). The dominant theory of decisions 
under risk is the expected utility theory. In this framework, risk attitude is a feature of the 
shape of the utility function that underlies a person’s choices (Weber et al., 2002). A utility 
function can be graphed in a diagram with utility on the y-axis and something of value on the 
x-axis, such as wealth, income or money, see Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk preferences (Source: Policonomics, 2012) 
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People who are less willing to take risk are often described as risk averse and have a concave 
utility function (left-hand graph). They will gain less utility from an uncertain option with an 
expected value of x, than from an option with a certain value of x. This can be illustrated as a 
choice between an uncertain option where one could win $10 or nothing with equal 
probabilities and a certain payment of $5. The expected value of the uncertain option is $5 
($10*0.5 + $0*0.5). A person who is indifferent between this certain and uncertain option, is 
risk neutral (middle graph). For these people the utility of an uncertain option with expected 
value x, is equal to the utility of a certain payment of x.  
 
People who are more willing to take risk are often described as risk seeking and have a 
convex utility function (right-hand graph). They could gain utility from accepting an uncertain 
option even if the expected value is below the certain payment (Mongin, 1997). Yates and 
Stone (1992) states that the “pure” attitude towards risk is always negative and people will 
require a premium in return to take on risk. This relationship was established several decades 
ago in studies by Pratt (1964), Arrow (1965), Ross (1981) and others who all find individual 
human decision makers to be risk averse.  
 
There is a large literature on gender differences in risk-taking behavior. Not only within the 
field of economics, but also within sociology and psychology. The studies are conducted in 
numerous ways and contexts and provides a solid foundation for discussion. We will focus on 
the studies framed in an economic context.  
 
One of the largest meta-analysis on this topic was conducted in 1999 by Byrnes, Miller and 
Schafer. They compared 150 separate studies and classified 16 different types of risk taking. 
In 14 of the 16 different types, they found that there were a significant difference between 
males and females, with females being more risk averse. The differences where larger in 
certain contexts, such as intellectual risk taking, and smaller in others. The study also focused 
on gender differences as a variable of age, and found that the gender gap did vary with age, 
although the direction and magnitude depended on the context.   
 
More recent meta-analyses also find the same results. Charness and Gneezy (2011) gathered 
data from 15 sets of experiments that were not designed to investigate gender differences. All 
experiments are based on the same underlying investment game, but they were conducted by 
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different researchers in different countries and with different subject pools. This strengthens 
the conclusion that females are more risk averse than males.  
 
Croson and Gneezy (2009), compare several studies using both real and hypothetical gambles. 
Their robust findings are that men are more risk prone than women in both lab settings and 
investment decisions in the field (real life setting). One example of such a field study is 
Sunden and Surette’s (1998) investigation of asset allocation. They find that women invest 
their assets more conservatively than men do. Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997) also find that 
a large percentage of women invest in the minimum-risk portfolio available to them.  
 
Eckel and Grossman’s meta-study from 2008 found some differing results, depending on the 
type and framing of the independent studies. They separate experimental studies, where the 
subjects know that they participate in a study, from field studies, where subjects are observed 
in real life settings. Within the experimental studies, abstract experiments are separated from 
contextual environments. With an abstract environment, participants could for instance be 
asked to choose between a lottery and a safe payment. With a contextual environment, you 
add context to the experiment, framing the choices differently. In this case the participants 
might be asked to allocate their investment between a safe and a risky asset.  
 
Lastly, Eckel and Grossman distinguish between studies that conduct experiments in the gain 
domain and in the loss domain, referring to the framing of the games. As an example of an 
experiment in the gain domain one could ask the participants to choose between a safe 
payment of 10 dollars or a lottery where you can win 30 dollars or noting with equal 
probabilities. If this game were to be in the loss domain one could ask the participants to 
choose between losing 10 dollars with certainty or a lottery where you lose either 30 dollars 
or nothing with equal probabilities.  
 
The first study investigated in Eckel and Grossman is Brinig (1995). Brinig conducts abstract 
experiments in the gain domain, and does not perform experiments in the loss domain or in 
contextual environments. Brining finds that when gender is interacted with age, it becomes a 
significant predictor of risk taking. The difference in risk-taking peaks at about age 30. This 
could be explained by the tendency of men to be more risk seeking during the period when 
they are trying to attract mates. Women on the other hand are more risk averse during the 
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period when they usually have children. Both these periods often occur in the years around 
age 30. Several other studies also confirm that age has an impact on willingness to take risks. 
 
Most studies in the meta-analysis by Eckel and Grossman find females to be significantly 
more risk averse than males. Some studies are inconclusive and cannot find a significant 
difference between the genders. Only two studies find men to be more risk averse, and both of 
them are abstract experiments in the loss domain. Schubert et al. (1999) presents their subjects 
with four choices between certain payoffs and risky lotteries. Two of the choices are framed 
in an abstract environment, and the two others in a contextual environment. Within each 
environment, one choice is presented as a potential gain and the other as a potential loss. In 
the contextual environment, the results are inconclusive. In the abstract environment, the 
results are significant. However, the results are reversed from the gain domain to the loss 
domain, stating that females are most risk averse in the gain domain, while men are more risk 
averse in the loss domain. These are interesting results, although not unambiguously 
supported by other research.  
 
In summary, Eckel and Grossman are rather conservative in their view, stating that “the 
findings thus far shed serious doubt on the existence of risk attitude as a measurable, stable 
personality trait”. They argue that it is difficult to make any conclusion about the gender 
difference. This stands in contrast to Charness and Gneezy (2012), who named their 
comparative analysis Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Risk Taking. Evidently, the 
researchers are not unanimous in regards to the evidence of gender differences. Literature 
tends to either find females to be more risk averse, or no significant gender differences. 
Studies finding females to be more risk averse are robust across different contexts, especially 
in the gain domain.    
 
2.2 Reference dependent preferences and loss aversion 
 
Prospect theory is a framework that formalizes the idea of loss aversion and reference 
dependence preferences. This theory was presented as a critic against the expected utility 
theory, which was the dominated model of decision making under risk (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) base their critic on empirical evidence 
revealing that people are not always rational or consistent when it comes to their preferences. 
In particular, people have a tendency to overweight outcomes that are obtained with certainty 
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to outcomes that are merely probable. This so called certainty effect contributes to risk 
seeking behavior in choices involving sure losses and risk aversion in choices involving sure 
gains. In addition, people tend to simplify choices between alternatives by focusing on 
components that differentiates them. Thus, people often disregard components that are shared 
among the alternatives. This isolation effect may produce inconsistency in people’s 
preferences when the same choice is presented in different ways (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979).  
 
Compared to expected utility theory, prospect theory assigns value to gains and losses rather 
than to final assets, and replaces probabilities with decision weights. The prospect theory 
model is outlined in Figure 2 below. Three essential features characterize the value function: 
reference dependence, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. The location of the reference 
point has implications for the perception of an outcome as a gain or a loss. Loss aversion is 
the tendency of people to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. A loss will have a greater 
negative impact on satisfaction, than the positive impact of a gain of the exact same amount 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). The concept of diminishing sensitivity is that “marginal 
value of both gains and losses decreases with their size” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, p. 
1039). These three properties creates an S-shaped value function that is convex below the 
reference point and concave above it.  
 
 
Figure 2: An illustration of a value function (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, p. 1040).   
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The concavity of the value function entails risk aversion in the gain domain, whereas the 
convexity entails risk seeking in the loss domain. Risk seeking in the loss domain has by 
several investigators been confirmed and seems to be accepted in the literature as rather 
robust (e.g. Fishburn and Kochenberger, 1979; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Payne, 
Laughhunn, and Crum, 1980; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1982). This has further 
been observed by studies using nonmonetary outcomes (e.g. Fischhoff, 1983; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). Evidence suggests that being risk seeking in the loss domain is especially 
strong when the probabilities of loss are substantial (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).  
 
However, some studies have questioned prospect theory’s applicability. One study conducted 
by List (2004), which look into prospect theory vs. neoclassical theory in the marketplace, 
states that prospect theory falls short of predicting people’s behavior when they are 
experienced. They point to the fact that people, when experienced, approaches the 
neoclassical prediction. This implies that prospect theory may only be applicable to 
inexperienced people or consumers. However, it is important to notice that the prospect theory 
only helps economist to explain what people do in certain situations, it does not substitute the 
idea of revealed preferences.  
 
The idea behind prospect theory is that people are loss averse and that they experience gains 
and losses relative to some reference point. This can explain several important social 
phenomena (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998). More specifically it can explain the concepts 
of framing, status quo bias, the endowment effect and last but not least the default effect.   
 
Prospect theory proposes that framing or phrasing matters. The way alternatives are framed or 
presented has by empirical testing been demonstrated to have big influences on people’s 
choices (e.g. Tversky and Kahnmeman, 1991). This is illustrated in a classical experiment, 
named “the Asian disease”, by Tversky and Kahneman in 1981.  
 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs as follow: 
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The first treatment group was asked to choose between program A and B: 
1. If program A is adopted 200 people will be saved (72%) 
2. If program B is adopted, there is one-third probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved (28%)   
 
The other treatment group was asked to choose between program C and D:  
1. If program C is adopted, 400 people will die (22%) 
2. If program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a 
two-thirds probability that 600 people will die (78%) 
 
In this experiment the reference point is that everyone will die, which is stated in the 
introduction. Results shows that when the options are framed positively 72% of the sample 
chose the risk averse option (alternative A), whereas only 22% chose the equivalent option 
(alternative C) when the options are framed negatively. Hence, people seem to choose 
alternatives that are framed positive rather than negative, depending on the reference point. In 
other words, people tend to experience loss aversion.    
 
The status quo concept is related to the reference point. One implication of loss aversion is the 
tendency of people to stick with the current situation (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990). 
The mechanism behind loss aversion causes us to be more afraid of the potential losses of 
switching from status quo than the potential gains. However, in the absence of loss aversion 
several other factors can induce a status quo bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser (1988) offers several explanations to this bias, including inertia, cost of 
thinking, fear of regret in making a wrong decision, transaction costs, perceiving what have 
worked in the past as a safe option, and avoiding the need to make an active choice, i.e. 
preference of doing nothing.  
 
A series of decision-making experiments show that individuals often stick with the status quo 
alternative (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). In their experiments, Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988), frame a hypothetical situation by giving one group an alternative as a 
status quo, rather than provide all the alternatives as options, as opposed to the other group. 
Their results imply that, the framing of an alternative, whether it is in the status quo position 
or not, significantly affect the likelihood that the alternative will be chosen. The robustness of 
status quo bias is enhanced by field studies revealing consistent results (e.g. Hartman, Doane 
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and Woo, 1991; Madrian and Shea, 2000). This implies that status quo bias is important in 
“real world” decisions and not only within an artificial laboratory setting. 
 
The endowment effect, which is closely related to the concept of status quo, is a bias that 
make people stick with the current option. Loss aversion affects people to value a good more 
when the good becomes part of their endowment, i.e. when people own the good themselves 
(Kahneman et al., 1990). Several researchers have demonstrated the prevalence of the 
endowment effect (e.g. Knetsch and Sinden, 1984, Knetsch, 1989; Loewenstein and 
Kahneman, 1991). In Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler’s (1990) study, half the participants 
were given a coffee mug and the opportunity to sell it. The other half were given the 
opportunity to buy a coffee mug. With no endowment effect, the price people would be 
willing to accept for selling the mug should be similar to the price people are willing to pay 
for the mug. However, this is not the case. The “willingness to accept” was about twice as 
high as the “willingness to pay”. Once people had established an ownership of the mug, they 
valued it much higher. In spite of this, List (2004) argues that “the consumer learns to 
overcome the endowment effect in situations beyond specific problems they have previously 
encountered” (List, 2004, p. 615). This is consistent with List’s criticism toward prospect 
theory’s applicability to experienced consumers.   
 
Brown and Krishna (2004, p. 529) defines a default option as “the one the consumer will 
automatically receive if he/she does not explicitly specify otherwise”. Hence, a default can be 
described as the tendency to stick with the status quo (reference point). However, there are 
other mechanisms giving power to the default option. When someone sets a default, many 
people might believe, wrongly or rightly, that the default is set that way it is for a reason. 
They might perceive the default as an implicit endorsement or recommendation from those 
who chose the default (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). One last mechanism worth mentioning is 
laziness and procrastination, which in several contexts can be a main reason for the 
effectiveness of a default setting (Cronqvist and Haler, 2004). When people do not bother to 
make a choice or always intend to make the choice tomorrow, the default setting will be 
chosen for them.  
 
Default options have proven to be effective and powerful in many settings ranging from 
insurance, investment and marketing, to organ donations and health care (Johnson et al., 
2012). For instance, if people are automatically enrolled in retirement plans, their savings can 
increase significantly (Sunstein, 2014).  
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A default choice is listed as one of the most important and efficient types of “nudges” 
(Sunstein, 2014). A Nudge is an idea born in the US and popularized by Richard H. Thaler 
and Cass R. Sunstein through their best-selling book “Nudge” published in 2008. It is based 
on the idea that small and apparently insignificant details can have major impacts on people’s 
behavior. In their book, Sunstein and Thaler (2008, p. 6) define nudge in the following way:  
 
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be 
easy and cheap to avoid.  
 
Choice architecture can be understood as the context in which people make decisions. This 
could be the way the choice is presented or the order of the alternatives. Almost everything 
that could affect people’s choices can be called a nudge. One example is the placement of 
healthy food in grocery stores and canteens. If it is placed where it is easy to see and pick, it is 
more likely that people would choose it, as opposed to if it was placed somewhere more 
hidden. However, it would not count as a nudge if it constrained people’s alternatives. 
Banning junk food cannot be called a nudge (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). 
 
Other examples of nudges include reducing the size of the plate to make people eat smaller 
portions, reminding people about the health consequences of smoking, displaying the number 
of calories in meals, automatic enrollment in a pension plan, double-paged printing as a 
default setting and a text message to remind people about their doctor’s appointment for the 
next day (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008).  
 
One study, conducted by Heijden, Klein, Müller and Potters (2011), provides some interesting 
findings about personality and the influence of a nudge. They were interested in people’s time 
preferences (or discounting rates) and the relationship between time preferences and nudging. 
They conducted a study using a sample of 1102 Dutch individuals were they nudged 
individuals to evaluate risk in combination instead of in isolation. The result showed that 
impatient individuals are more “nudgeable” than patient ones. These results are important 
because, as Heijden et al. describes, “impatient individuals are often the target group of 
nudges as impatience is associated with problematic behaviors such as low savings, little 
equity holdings, low investment in human capital, and an unhealthy lifestyle” (Heijden et al., 
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2011, p. 1). They concludes their study by encouraging more research on the topic, and 
especially on the effects of other types of nudges. They express that “it would be interesting to 
see whether default effects or the impact of commitment devices are stronger for impatient 
than for patient individuals.” (Heijden et al., 2011, p. 17). 
 
There is not much available literature on gender differences in risk taking when it comes to 
the direct influence of a default effect. We could only find one study touching upon this 
question. Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach and Szykman (2008) investigated the gender difference 
in framing effects, including default effects. Their study differs from ours in several aspects, 
for instance that are they using a more contextual environment. Nevertheless, their results 
could provide some indications of what to expect. They studied framing in the context of 
retirement savings, and gave their subjects the option between purchasing an annuity (safe 
option) and investing their savings on their own (risky option). They look into two different 
framing effects, namely attribute framing (or negative framing), and default effects.  
 
The attribute framing was given as a five minute slide-show highlighting the negative aspects 
of one of the options. They find women to be influenced by the negative framing of 
investments, whereas men are influenced by the negative framing of both options. Regarding 
the default, participants were either given the investment, the annuity or neither of the two as 
a default option. They find that giving the investment as default has no significant effect on 
neither of the genders. Giving the annuity as default influenced male risk taking in one of 
their regression models, but not in the two other models. Female risk taking was not 
influenced by any default. These findings stand in contrast to the prevalent results in the 
literature, which find defaults to influence decision making. The authors argue that this might 
be the case because their default is too weak to cause an effect. We could not find any other 
studies investigating the gender differences in default bias. However, more studies have look 
at gender differences when it comes to other types of framing effects. 
 
Another study conducted by Hasseldine and Hite (2003) use goal framing by manipulating 
“two objectively equivalent messages (one positively framed, one negatively framed) that are 
communicated to adult taxpayers” (p. 517). They find that women are more influenced or 
persuaded when messages are positively framed, whereas men are more persuaded when 
negatively framed. Regarding goal framing, several other studies find that negatively framed 
messages are more persuasive than positive ones independent of gender (e.g. Ganzach and 
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Karsahi, 1995; Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987). However, one should note that Hasseldine 
and Hite (2003) find females to be less interested and experienced with tax matters.  
 
A third framing effect is characterized as risky choice framing, and an example of this is the 
“Asian disease” experiment outlined above. Fagley and Miller (1990) look into experiments 
that have revealed different results in the “Asian disease” and find that women are influenced 
by framing. Men, on the other hand, seem to be consistent in their preferences independent of 
framing. These results across tasks domains (attribute, goal and risky choice framing) indicate 
that gender differences in framing effects exist, although highly context specific. The framing 
effect seems to be influenced by interest and experience (Hasseldine and Hite, 2003). We 
therefore highlight the necessity to separate individual decision making in different task 
domains when investigating framing effects (Huang and Wang, 2010).                 
 
Regarding gender differences in status quo bias, endowment effect or loss aversion, we find 
one study that looks into possible gender differences in loss aversion. Schmidt and Traub 
(2001) conducted an experimental test of loss aversion. They find significant results implying 
that women experience loss aversion more frequently and to a higher degree than men. This 
finding implies that loss aversion may only be an important factor for some people, in this 
case females. They report that female subjects substantially contribute to their finding that 
people experience loss aversion in decision making. “Thus, the conclusion may be drawn, that 
women have a higher degree of risk aversion than men at least partly because they are more 
loss averse” (Schmidt and Traub, 2001, p. 18).  
 
Considering that the literature did not have much to offer on which gender is most affected by 
the default option, we turned to other related literatures to try to find research that could help 
us answer our research question. Although it might not be directly related, it could help us 
formulate our hypothesis. A meta-study by Eagly and Carli (1981) find that women are more 
easily influenced in general than men. They also find women to be more persuadable and 
conforming than men. As this meta-study includes 148 separate studies, making the results 
more reliable, this might indicate that women are more influenced by a default effect than 
men. 
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2.3 Combining risk-taking behavior and the default effect 
 
We have now reviewed the relevant concepts and empirical findings in the current literature 
on risk-taking behavior and the default effect. Our study will combine these two literatures by 
investigating the relationship between the gender difference in risk-taking and the influence of 
a default effect. We will look into whether the gender difference might be caused by the 
framing of choices. If most choices are framed with a safe option as default, this might partly 
explain the observed gender gap.  
 
Most studies on risk-taking have found females to be more risk averse than males. We 
presume that we will find similar results. Regarding the default effect, studies have shown 
that people’s choices are affected by a default option. However, there is limited research on 
gender differences. The only study found discovered no gender differences in default bias 
(Agnew et al., 2008). Schmidt and Traub (2001) find women to be more biased by loss 
aversion, and Fagley and Miller (1990) find that women are influenced by framing although 
men does not seem to be influenced. Eagly and Carli (1981) find women to be more easily 
influenced than males in general. Based on these indications in the literature, we find it 
reasonable to believe that females will be influenced by the default to a larger degree than 
males. This means that when exposed to a safe default, the gender gap in risk-taking will 
increase. When exposed to a risky default, the gender gap in risk-taking will be narrowed. To 
summarize our expectations, we define our hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: The gender gap in risk-taking is larger with a safe default than with a risky default.  
 
The following illustration demonstrates our research hypothesis:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Research hypothesis  
 
Gender Risk taking 
Default 
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Based on previous research we assume that gender has an influence on risk taking. Females 
exhibit more risk averse behavior and males exhibit more risk seeking behavior. Furthermore, 
we expect that a default, or reference point, will moderate the effect of gender on risk taking. 
If the default is set to a safe option, the gender effect will be amplified, making the difference 
between males and females larger. If the default is set to a risky option, the gender effect will 
be dampened, making the gender difference smaller.  
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3. Methodology 
 
 
The purpose of our study is to investigate the influence of a default effect on the gender gap in 
risk-taking behavior. We intend to explain the causal relationship between these variables 
using statistical analyses. To test and focus evidence about causal relationships, an experiment 
will be the most appropriate research strategy. Within this choice lies an implicit assumption 
that reality can be measured by numbers and analyzed with statistical techniques (Jacobsen, 
2000). An experiment is ideal for a casual effect study because it helps eliminating other 
factors influencing risk-taking by comparing similar groups, where the only difference is the 
treatment itself or chance1 (Haslam and McGarty, 2004). 
 
In this chapter we present our experimental design. The chapter is divided in two subchapters. 
The first subchapter explains the design and structure of the experiment by describing the 
three main parts of the experiment in chronological order. The next subchapter explains how 
the experiment was carried out. This section also offers a description of the platform used to 
recruit the participants and a presentation of our obtained sample. 
 
3.1 Design of the experiment 
 
The experiment consists of three main parts: the work task, the part where we measure risk-
taking behavior and the background questions. In addition, there is an introduction where the 
participants are informed about confidentiality, duration, payment and that participation is 
completely voluntary. In the next three sections we describe each of the three main parts in 
detail and justify why the different parts are included in the experiment. The fourth and last 
section of this subchapter provides an overview of the experiment and the effects we want to 
investigate. The complete survey is presented in Appendix A.1. 
 
3.1.1 Part one: Work task  
 
The first component of the experiment is a work task that all participants have to complete. 
This part is included to make the participant feel more entitled to the bonus they receive later 
on. By making people “work” for their bonus, we seek to increase the feeling that they 
                                                     
1 “By chance “significant” findings may occur. For example, by chance 5 out of 100 correlation coefficients are 
expected to be significant at a 5 % level” (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010) 
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deserve the bonus, thereby making it appear more valuable. The specific task is a picture 
categorization task, where the participants are asked to choose the elements that best describes 
a given picture. They have to work on each picture for 30 seconds before they are 
automatically given a new picture. There are 6 different pictures, implying that the work task 
will last for 3 minutes in total. 
 
3.1.2 Part two: Measuring risk-taking behavior  
 
The second part is the main part of the study. This is where we measure the participants’ risk-
taking behavior. Risk-taking behavior is the dependent variable in our study and needs to be 
operationalized into a factor that can be empirically measured. We have chosen a simple and 
clean-cut design where the participants are given a choice between a safe payment and a 
lottery ticket. In this context, the action of choosing lottery indicates a risk seeking behavior 
and a higher preference for risk. Choosing the safe payment indicates a risk averse behavior 
and a lower preference for risk. This experimental design is chosen due to its predicative 
power of risk-taking behavior and its prevalence as a measurement in existing research (e.g. 
Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund, 2002; Schubert, et al., 1999).  
 
In specific, the choice is structured as follows: the participants get the option between a safe 
payment of 1 USD and a lottery with the possibility to win 2.5 USD or nothing, with equal 
probabilities. The two alternatives, safe payment and lottery, would have the same expected 
value if the safe payment was 1 USD and the lottery was 2 USD or nothing with equal 
probabilities2. If people were risk neutral, they would be indifferent in the choice between 
these two alternatives. However, as most people are risk averse rather than risk neutral, they 
would gain more utility from choosing the safe payment. Ideally, we would want to offer 
alternatives that would make equally many participants chose the safe payment and the 
lottery. Hence, we have to make the potential gain in the lottery larger than 2 USD. A review 
of previous studies on risk-taking behavior showed that a multiple of 2.5 appeared to be a 
reasonable ratio (e.g. Charness and Gneezy, 2001). 
 
We wanted to measure risk-taking through an incentivized choice with real money at stake 
because this is believed to yield more reliable and valid results than other measures. It is 
likely to assume that the probability of people answering in line with their true preferences is 
                                                     
2 Expected value of lottery: 2 USD * 0.5 (probability to win) + 0 USD * 0.5 (probability to lose) = 1 USD 
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increased when using real money, rather than a hypothetical lottery. Measuring risk-taking by 
asking the respondents directly about their behavior would not be an ideal method. 
Economists are skeptical about whether self-reported attitudes will reflect actual risk-taking 
behavior. Various factors, including self-serving biases, inattention, and strategic motives 
could cause respondents to distort their reported risk attitudes and behavior (Dohmen et al, 
2011). As a consequence, researchers rather rely on experimental measures of risk-taking 
behavior with real money at stake.  
 
3.1.2.1 Treatment variation  
 
In our experiment, participants are randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups, who 
each receive one of two different stimuli. The two groups will be similar with regards to all 
relevant aspects of the research, except the manipulation they receive. One treatment group 
will be given the lottery ticket as a default payment option, and thus exposed to a stimuli 
encouraging risk seeking behavior. The other treatment group will be given the safe payment 
as a default payment option, and thus exposed to a stimuli encouraging risk averse behavior. 
Regardless of their initial endowment (default), all participants get the opportunity to keep or 
exchange their received payment option.  
 
According to standard economic theory, assuming that humans are rational decision makers, a 
default option will not influence behavior. In this framework, people make consistent choices 
in line with their underlying preferences regardless of the framing of options. As opposed to 
this theory, we want to create a reference point or status quo for the participants through the 
default option provided. In the two treatment groups we intend to exploit people’s tendency to 
evaluate gains and losses relative to the status quo (reference dependence). In addition, we 
utilize their tendency to ascribe more value to things they own (the endowment effect) and 
their propensity to perceive a loss of something they own as much more powerful than 
gaining something they do not own (loss aversion). As explained in the literature review, 
these are the main effects (or biases) that make people stick to their initial endowment, rather 
than exchanging it. 
 
In some cases, the effectiveness of a default is caused by the fact that people are not aware 
that they have a choice, or because the transaction cost of changing from the default are too 
high. In our study, we do not want this to be the reason for the effectiveness of the default. 
  
21   . 
 
Consequently, we intend to make it clear to the participants that they have a free choice. We 
make it easy for them to choose the alternative they want by eliminating transaction costs. 
The default option is implemented by slightly changing in the wording of the question 
provided to the two groups. The potential problem with this design is that the default might be 
too weak to cause an effect. However, it will be even more interesting if this small change in 
the choice architecture has an effect on decision making.  
 
3.1.3 Part three: Background questions  
 
The third and last part is questions about the participants’ background. This part includes 
questions about gender, age, geography, living area, ethnicity, education, economic education, 
occupation, income, marital status and number of children. In addition, there is a question 
about time preferences. As discussed in the literature review, Heijden et al., (2011) find that 
impatient individuals are more influenced by a nudge than patient ones. We find it interesting 
to test whether this personality trait also is related to the default effect.   
 
We chose to measure time preference in a slightly different way than in this study. We base 
our measurement on Dohmen et al. (2015), which makes use of the question “How willing are 
you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from that in 
the future?” This question is general and does not only apply to the financial context 
specifically. We use a seven-point Likert’s scale where 1 means you are "completely 
unwilling to do so" and 7 means you are "very willing to do so".  
 
The control variables are important because they allow us to compare people with the same 
background. They eliminate rivalry explanations, enabling us to identify the relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variable. We want to control that the effect on the 
dependent variable is actually caused by the independent variables and not by a third variable, 
like education or ethnicity. This will increase the probability of revealing a true causal 
relationship. 
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3.1.4 Overview of experiment  
 
One of the main benefits of our design is that we have control over the experimental situation 
and context. For this reason we can eliminate most other causes to the variation in the 
dependent variable, in our case risk-taking behavior. An example of a rivalry explanation is 
different perceptions of the probability of winning the lottery. If men perceive this probability 
differently than females, this could cause a difference in risk behavior. We want to isolate the 
effect of the default, and thus eliminate this possibility by providing the participants with the 
probabilities of winning and losing the lottery.  
 
If the choice between safe payment and lottery was to take place in a real life situation, factors 
such as other incentives and different pay-off structures could cause variation. This is the 
drawback of a field study. Even though field studies better capture reality and real life choices 
than experimental studies, it may be difficult or impossible to isolate specific causes of the 
observed effects. In experimental studies, we are permitted to change each variable in a 
controlled and systematic manner. In our study, we place men and women in the same 
situation and the same context, thereby isolating the cause of variation in risk behavior to the 
variation in default bias and gender.  
 
The experiment is outlined in Table 1 below.  
Experiment Groups Stimuli Output 
Risky Default Group Risky Option as Default (XR) 
Male Average Risk-taking (XRM) 
Female Average Risk-taking (XSF) 
Safe Default Group Safe Option as Default (XS) 
Male Average Risk-taking (XRM) 
Female Average Risk-taking (XSF) 
 
Table 1: Overview of the two experimental groups 
 
There are two effects influencing risk taking. The first one is the treatment effect, measured as 
the difference between average risk-taking in the Risky Default Group and average risk-
taking in the Safe Default Group, (XR – XS). If the default has an impact on people’s choices, 
we would see that participants initially getting the lottery ticket as payment would be more 
likely to keep the lottery, and not exchange it for the safe payment. Participants initially 
getting the safe payment, would be more likely to keep the safe payment, and not exchange it 
for the lottery. In this case, XR would be larger than XS, making the treatment effect (XR – XS) 
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positive. If the default has no effect on risk-taking behavior, XR and XS would be equal, 
making (XR – XS) = 0.  
 
The second effect is the gender effect, measured as the difference between average risk-taking 
behavior among men and average risk-taking behavior among women, (XM - XF). If males are 
more risk seeking than females, XM will be larger than XF, making the gender gap positive, (XM - 
XF) > 0. If females are more risk seeking than males, the gender gap will be negative, (XM - 
XF) < 0. If we find no difference in risk-taking behavior among males and females, there will 
be no gender gap, (XM - XF) = 0.  
 
The effect we are interested in is the product of these two effects together, namely the 
interaction effect of gender and treatment. Instead of looking at the treatment effect on risk-
taking behavior in general, we want to look at the treatment effect on the gender gap in risk-
taking behavior. We intend to investigate whether females are more influenced by the default 
bias than males. If this is the case, the females in the Risky Default Group will be more 
influenced by the risky default than males in this group. This will make females come closer 
to the risk-taking behavior of males, which in turn will decrease the gender gap (XRM – XRF). 
Under the same assumption, the opposite will happen in the Safe Default Group. Here, 
females will be more affected than males by the safe default, making females even more risk 
averse on average compared to males. Thus increasing the gender gap (XSM – XSF).  
 
Our hypothesis is that we will find evidence of a positive interaction effect, where the gender 
gap in the Safe Default Group is larger than the gender gap in the Risky Default Group. This 
can be mathematically formulated as: (XSM – XSF) - (XRM – XRF) > 0.  
 
3.2 Conducting the experiment  
 
This subchapter explains how our experiment was executed and consequently how our data 
was collected. The subchapter starts with a short discussion on online experiments and a 
presentation of the platform used to recruit participants. We have performed power 
calculations to determine the required sample size for our experiment, which will be presented 
in section two. The third section explains how the experiment was executed, and describes 
some of the most important considerations we did regarding the implementation. The last 
section provides a brief overview of the sample. A more comprehensive documentation of the 
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details regarding the experiment is provided in section A.2 in the Appendix. Ethical 
considerations regarding our study are evaluated in Appendix A.3. 
 
3.2.1 Online Experiments and Amazon Mechanical Turk  
 
We made use of an online experiment instead of a lab experiment. Online experiments have 
recently become very popular, and have several advantages compared to the traditional lab 
experiment. One of the most important advantages is that online experiments are easier to 
conduct. A lot of the work that is done manually in lab experiments, is done automatically in 
online experiments (Dandurand, Schultz and Onishi, 2008). Automation further increases 
flexibility and saves time and resources. It is a relatively inexpensive way of reaching a large 
and more diverse sample compared to the standard student population often used in lab or 
field experiments (Rademacher and Lippke, 2007). 
 
Furthermore, it is easier and faster to get enough participants and to get the right kind of 
sample. This is important to be able to generalize the results to wider populations3. Online 
experiments permits the participants to conduct the experiments in the comfort of their own 
home, which may serve as a more natural decision-making environment than a lab. This 
might also cause less stress on the participants (Duersch, Oechssler and Schipper, 2009; 
Vinogradov and Shadrina, 2013). Research directly comparing results from experiments 
conducted online and in a laboratory setting have generally found consistent results, 
especially for shorter and simpler experiments (e.g. Dandurand et al., 2008; Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava and John, 2004; Meyerson and Tryon, 2003; Riva, Teruzzi and Anolli, 2003). 
 
The participants for our study are recruited through the platform Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk). mTurk is an online global marketplace created by Amazon. On this platform 
workers choose which jobs or Human Intelligent Tasks (HITs) to do for pay. It is used by a 
growing body of researchers to conduct economic experiments. mTurk has one of the largest 
subject pools available among crowdsourcing4 platforms (Mason and Suri, 2011). Hence, 
mTurk is convenient and enable us to collect data from a large and diverse subject pool, at a 
low cost, in a short amount of time, reducing geographical and financial constraints on 
research (Mason and Suri, 2011; Paolacci, 2012).  
                                                     
3 See section A.6.1.2 about external validity for a further discussion about generalizability.  
4 Howe (2006, ref. in Mason and Suri 2012) defines crowdsourcing as “a job outsourced to an undefined group 
of people in the form of an open call”. 
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Several researchers have investigated the representativeness of mTurk as a sampling frame. 
Paolacci (2012) directly compares mTurk participants to traditional subject pools. He finds 
consistent results with previous decision making research implying that a sample obtained 
from mTurk is as least as fit as traditional samples to draw general conclusion about tasks 
involving money and risk.  
 
When it comes to preferences for time and money, it is worth noting that Paolacci (2012) 
finds mTurkers to be less extraverted, less emotionally stable, and to have lower self-esteem. 
In addition, Paloacci (2012) finds the attention levels to be lower among mTurkers than the 
other samples. We thereby have to acknowledge that mTurkers might be different from non-
mTurkers on social and financial traits (Paolacci, 2012). However, “there are numerous 
studies that show correspondence between the behavior of workers on Mechanical Turk and 
behavior offline or in other online contexts. While there are clearly differences between 
Mechanical Turk and offline contexts, evidence that Mechanical Turk is a valid means of 
collecting data is consistent and continues to accumulate” (Mason and Suri, 2004, p. 4). A 
more extensive discussion of the benefits and weaknesses of using this platform is provided in 
the sections on validity and reliability in Appendix A.6. 
 
We chose to narrow our sample to include only Americans. The sample was not limited with 
regard to any other background variables. This was done because we wanted the sample to 
mimic the US population. In addition, we wanted a diverse and rich sample to be able to 
analyze the impact on risk-taking of different backgrounds. By using mTurk as a sampling 
frame, the sample can be categorized as a non-probability sample with a self-selection 
sampling technique. Each participant has to decide for themselves if they want to be a part of 
our study. This is not the optimal sampling method for a causal study (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009). A better method would have been to randomly select the desired number of 
participants from the total population, in our case the total US population. As this is not 
possible, the self-selection sampling method is the best feasible option in our case. 
 
3.2.2 Power calculations  
 
Power calculations (or power analysis) is a process for determining the sample size for a 
research study. The sample size depends on the desired level of statistical significance, 
statistical power and the expected effect size (Cohen, 1992). Statistical power could be 
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explained as the probability of determining a true effect when it exists. The input variables 
will vary from study to study. In most cases, power analysis involves a number of simplifying 
assumptions. Consequently, a power calculation will not give a 100 % correct answer.   
 
We made use of the statistical software GPower to analyze the needed sample size. Cohen 
(1992) recommends a standard significance level (α) of 0.05 and a power (1-β) of 0.80. We 
will use both t-tests and multiple linear regression in our analysis. For a one-tailed t-test the 
total required sample size is 620 (310 in each group) to detect small effects, 102 (51 in each 
group) to detect medium sized effects, and 42 (21 in each group) to detect large effects. For a 
two-tailed t-test the required sample sizes are 788, 128 and 52 respectively, for small, medium 
and large effects.  
 
To determine the required sample size for the regression analysis, we will again use a 
significance level (α) of 0.05 and a power (1-β) of 0.80. The number of tested predictors in 
our regression is 3 (gender, treatment and gender*treatment), while the total number of 
predictors (which includes control variables) is 12. The required sample size is 550 to detect 
small effects, 78 to detect medium effects and 35 to detect large effects. The figure below 
shows the required sample size on the y-axis and the effect size on the x-axis. For multiple 
linear regressions, one usually regard effect sizes of about 0.02 to be a small effect and effect 
sizes of about 0.15 to be a medium effect. The blue line implies a power (1-β) of 0.90, and the 
red line a power (1-β) of 0.80. Thus a higher power requires a larger sample size. 
 
 
Figure 3: Required sample size for multiple linear regression 
  
27   . 
 
We could not find previous studies investigating the same effect as we are interested in (the 
interaction between gender and default effect), which also found significant results.  
Consequently, we cannot be sure about what effect size to expect. The main effect in focus 
(the interaction effect) is a so called difference in difference (difference in treatment effect in 
the difference between the genders), which further complicates the calculation. If we were to 
only investigate the gender difference, which is a simple difference, we would have previous 
studies to look to. For instance Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Jonker (2002), which 
conducted three separate surveys with large sample sizes (2011, 1599 and 17097 
respondents). They estimated a risk aversion parameter, and found women’s estimated 
parameter to be 10 % to 30 % larger than men’s. This effect size is generally categorized as a 
small effect for t-tests. Therefore, we would need a sample size of up to 620 to detect a 
similar effect with a one-tailed t-test.  
 
Since we are doing an incentivized experiment, our sample size is restricted by budget 
constraints. The Choice Lab5 helped us finance our study, and we developed a sensible budget 
and sample size in collaboration with our supervisor Alexander W. Cappelen. The total 
sample size of our study is therefore 360 participants. With an α of 0.05 and a power (1-β) of 
0.80, this sample size would enable us to detect an effect size of 0.03 in our regression 
analysis (in line with the graph above). These numbers seem promising, and we believe a 
sample size of 360 will be sufficient to detect potential effects.  
 
3.2.3 Implementation and execution  
 
After the experimental design had been developed, applied and approved, the experiment was 
ready to be launched on mTurk. It was carried out in collaboration with Ph.D. students at The 
Choice Lab, who were more experienced with experiments on mTurk. They made sure that 
there were no deficiencies in our design and that the survey ran smoothly. This was ensured 
by running the survey in a test environment on mTurk called “Sandbox”. Here one can make 
sure that the connection between mTurk and our survey in Qualtrics was working fine.  
 
The qualification and “quality” of the participants was ensured through specifications in the 
survey. When the survey was launched, we were able to set criterions that the mTurk workers 
were required to meet in order to work on our HIT. We required the worker’s HIT Approval 
                                                     
5 The Choice Lab is a research group at the Department of Economics, at the Norwegian School of Economics. 
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rate6 to be 95 % or greater. In addition, the workers must previously have taken 1000 or more 
HITs to be able take our survey. These actions ensure that the participants are familiar with 
the process of conducting HITs and surveys.  
 
Ideally, we would want the number of males and females in our sample to be identical. 
However, there are no feature on mTurk to ensure this. An alternative would be to use a 
method developed by researchers at The Choice Lab. This method gives an equal amount of 
male and female participants by first allowing females to take the HIT. When the desired 
amount of female partisipants is reached (in our case 180), the HIT is closed for females, and 
opened for males. When the same amount of male partisipants is reached, the HIT is closed.  
 
There are several drawbacks with this technique. Firstly, workers on mTurk are not 
automatically registrerd with gender. Thus, participants who previously has conducted 
experiments carried out by The Choice Lab, are registered as males or females. When using 
the method of equal gender composition, the only workers who can participate in the study 
are those registered by The Choice Lab. This may prove problematic as it might cause 
selection bias. The sample is further affected because all females are recruited at a different 
point in time than men. As an example, if we assume that the study got all its 360 responses 
during 10-12 hours, it might happen that all females take the survey in the morning and 
midday, while all males take the survey in the evening. This might cause biased results.  
 
A third drawback is related to the fact that the pool of participants is significantly restricted 
when using this method. When the only workers allowed to do our survey are those registered 
by The Choice Lab, it would take considerably longer to get the desired sample size. It could 
take several days instead of a few hours. In summary, the probability of something going 
wrong is considerably larger when using this method compared to executing a “normal” HIT 
where everyone (who meets the requirements) are allowed to participate. Based on an 
evaluation of benefits and weaknesses we decided to use a normal HIT, despite the risk of 
getting an unequal distribution of males and females. The decision was justified by the fact 
that the distribution of male and female workers on mTurk is rather equal, although there are 
slightly more males than females.  
                                                     
6 The HIT Approval Rate is a “System Qualification”. ”A Worker’s HIT Approval Rate is calculated as the 
Workers' Lifetime Assignments Approved divided by the Worker's Lifetime Number of Assignments Submitted 
- on ALL Assignments” (The Mechanical Turk Blog, 2011). 
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3.2.4 Sample  
 
Our planned sample size was 360 participants. This was the number of participants 
completing the survey in Qualtrics. However, a technical failure caused 371 participants to be 
registered on mTurk, and only 354 to be included in our dataset. This implies that our sample 
size ended up being 354 instead of 360. As this is such a small deviation (0.017 %), it will not 
influence our data analysis or results. In chapter A.1 in the Appendix is an overview of the 
descriptive statistics of our sample based on background characteristics.  
 
The sample consists of 55 % males and 45 % females. The distribution of participants 
according to occupational status, ethnicity and education is presented below in Figure 5.In our 
distribution, most participants belong to the occupational group Employed (62 %). 
Furthermore, the largest ethnic group by far is White Americans, accounting for 80 % of the 
total sample, followed by Asian Americans (5.9 %) and Black or African Americans (5.6 %). 
In terms of education, the distribution is more even, with most participants having 4-year 
college (38 %) or some college education (27 %). In addition, 61 % of participants have no 
education in economics.   
 
To assess whether the sample is representative for the US population, we made use of 
statistics provided by the United States Census Bureau, which is part of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce and provides high-quality economic analysis. The statistics are from 2013 and 
2014, but it is reasonable to believe that the statistics have not changed much in 1-2 years. 
The average age of our sample is 35.0 years, and the median age is 33 years. The reported 
median age of the U.S. population is 39.0 (“U.S Census Bureau”, 2014a). The gender 
distribution is 49.2 % male and 50.8 % female (“U.S. Census Bureau”, 2014b). 50.6 % of the 
population is married (“U.S Census Bureau”, 2013a), compared to 40 % in our sample.  
 
Concerning education, only 1 % of our sample has completed less than High School. In the 
general population this figure is 13.9 % (“U.S Census Bureau”, 2013a). The proportion who 
has two years College or more is 58 % in our sample and 37 % in general (“U.S Census 
Bureau”, 2013a). Concerning ethnicity in the U.S. today, 63.3 % are White Americans, 16.6 
% are Latin or Hispanic, 12.2 % are Black, and 4.8 % are Asian (“U.S Census Bureau”, 
2013b). Consequently, our sample is younger, more male dominated, higher educated and 
includes less ethnic minorities than the general U.S. population. In other words, the sample is 
rather similar, although not perfectly representative.   
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4. Results and analysis 
 
In this chapter we attempt to answer our research question by analyzing the data we have 
gathered in our experiment. First, we present some descriptive statistics to reveal the direction 
of our results and an initial idea of our findings. We make use of t-tests to investigate the 
results further and uncover whether any of the findings are statistically significant. As these 
tests cannot be used on interaction variables and do not include control variables, we perform 
multiple linear regressions to analyze the results while controlling for background variables. 
Lastly in this chapter, we do a short additional analysis to investigate the relationship between 
the default effect and people’s time preferences.  
 
4.1 Main analysis: Risk-taking behavior based on gender and treatment  
 
In the analysis, risk-taking behavior is measured as the percentage of participants choosing 
the risky option (lottery). Regarding the treatment effect, we find that the average risk-taking 
in the Risky Default Group is 35.79 %, while the average risk-taking in the Safe Default 
Group 31.46 %. This infers that the magnitude of the overall treatment effect for both 
genders, (X1 – X2), is 4.33 %, implying an increase of 11.24 %. This is the increase in risk-
taking behavior from the Safe Default Group to the Risky Default Group. Considering the 
gender effect, we find that the overall average risk-taking among males is 35.90 %, while the 
same numbers for females is 30.82 %. Hence, the overall gender effect for both treatment 
groups, (XM – XF) is 5.08 %, which is equivalent to an increase in risk-taking of 28.88 %. 
 
The figure below presents our main findings divided by both gender and treatment. It shows 
the average risk-taking behavior of males and females in the two treatment groups. In the 
Risky Default Group 35.79 % of males chose the risky payment and 35.80 % of females 
chose the risky payment. In the Safe Default Group 36.00 % of males chose lottery, while 
26.64 % of females chose lottery. What is interesting about these results is that when splitting 
the average risk-taking on both gender and treatment, we find that the treatment effect is non-
existing among males, and thus even more apparent among females. For females the treatment 
is increasing the average risk-taking by 10.61 %, which implies an increase of 34.38 %7. This 
is a large effect, as the risky treatment increases the proportion of women choosing the risky 
option by one third.  
                                                     
7 The increase from X2F to X1F is: (35.80 % / 26.64 %) – 1 = 34.38 % 
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Figure 5: Graphical overview of main results 
 
The gender effect differs substantially between the two treatment groups. In the Risky Default 
Group there is no difference in risk-taking behavior among males and females. In other 
words, when the default is set to a risky option, the gender gap disappears and females take 
equal amount of risk as males. On the other hand, in the Safe Default Group, the difference in 
risk-taking behavior is 10.36 %. This represents an increase of 35.13 % from females to 
males, which is a substantial effect size. The results appear to support our expectations of a 
gender difference, a treatment effect and a gender difference in the treatment effect. If the 
differences are large enough to be statistically significant needs to be tested.  
 
We want to test whether the treatment effect and the gender effect is significantly different 
form zero. This is done by comparing the average risk seeking behavior of the different 
subgroups in our sample. If the difference between the averages is large enough, the result 
will be statistically significant, implying that we can draw a confident conclusion on a 
particular significant level. All tests are two-sample t-tests of means with equal variances. 
Because we initially were unsure about the direction of our results, and whether they would 
be in line with our hypothesis, we conducted both one-tailed and two-tailed tests.  
 
When testing the treatment effect, the null hypotheses is that there is no difference between 
the Risky Default Group and the Safe Default Group in their average risk taking. The 
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alternative hypothesis for the two-tailed test is that the average risk-taking in the Risky 
Default Group is different from that of the Safe Default Group. For the one-tailed test, the 
alternative hypothesis is that the average risk-taking in the Risky Default Group is greater 
than that of the Safe Default Group. For males, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test is 0.98, 
implying that there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The same results are seen in 
the one-tailed t-test, with a p-value of 0.49. In other words, this test shows that for males there 
is no evidence of a treatment effect, and consequently no evidence of a default bias.  
 
Considering the treatment effect among females, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of 0.17, 
indicating that there are some, although not sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
For the one-tailed test, the p-value is half the p-value of the two-tailed test, namely 0.08. 
Consequently, the t-test proves that for females the average risk-taking in the Risky Group is 
greater than in the Safe Group, significant at the 90 % level. Thus, there is evidence of a 
treatment effect, or default bias, among females.  
 
The null hypothesis of the t-test to test the gender effect is that there is no difference between 
males and females in their average risk taking. The alternative hypothesis for the two-tailed 
test is that the average risk-taking among males is different from that of females. For the one-
tailed test, the alternative hypothesis is that the average risk-taking for males is greater than 
that of females. For the Safe Default Group, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test is 0.14 and the 
p-value of the one-tailed is 0.07. The one-tailed t-test proves that there is enough evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis at the 90 % significance level. This means that there is a gender gap 
in risk-taking behavior in the Safe Default Group with males being more risk seeking than 
females. For the Risky Default Group, the p-values for the two-tailed and one-tailed tests are 
0.99 and 0.49 respectively. Thus, there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis. In other 
words, the gender effect is only apparent when the participants have received the safe default 
and not the risky default.  
 
The effect we are most interested in is the interaction effect between treatment and gender. To 
investigate this effect further we make use of multiple linear regression. This technique allows 
us to identify the effects of gender and treatment on risk-taking behavior, while controlling for 
background variables. The general form of our regression equation is as follows:  
 
Risk-taking = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1* RD + 𝛽2* F + 𝛽3*RD*F + 𝛽𝑥* Control variables + … + 𝜀 
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RD (Risky Default) is an indicator variable for treatment group, taking the value 1 if the 
participant is in the Risky Default Group, and 0 if not. F (Female) is an indicator variable for 
gender, taking the value 1 if the participant is female, and 0 if male. RD*F is an interaction 
variable for treatment group and gender. This variable takes the value 1 if the participant is 
female and is in the risky default treatment group, if not, the value is 0. The reference group 
(base group) is males in the safe default treatment group.  
 
The dependent variable is risk taking, and is measured as the percentage of participants 
choosing lottery. If all participants chose lottery, the variable will be 1. If all participants 
chose safe payment, the variable will be 0. In the table below, the output of our main 
regressions is presented. Regression (1) includes only the indicator variable for treatment 
group and shows that the average treatment effect on risk-taking is 4.33%. This is the average 
increase in risk-taking behavior from the Safe Default Group to the Risky Default Group. 
Regression (2) includes the indicator variables for both treatment and gender, and shows that 
the size of the gender effect is 5.18 %. In addition to treatment and gender, regression (3) 
includes the interaction variable between gender and treatment, which in this regression is 
10.4 %. The regression shows that the average risk-taking in the safe default group is 36.0 % 
among males and 26.5 % among females. In the risky default group average risk-taking is 
35.79 % among males and females. These numbers are consistent with the averages computed 
in the beginning of this chapter.  
 
Regressions (4)-(6) control for background variables. The background variables included are 
age, income, economic education and time preference. These specific variables are included 
because they are the most significant ones when controlling for all background variables. We 
excluded variables having very little explanatory power, thus being redundant in the analysis. 
The control variables did not yield large difference in the beta value of the gender effect, 
compared to the regression with no controls. The treatment effect is reduced, but it is still not 
significantly different from zero, and thus not different from the regressions without control 
variables. This consistency was expected as the two treatment groups were randomized.  
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Table 2: Regression analysis: Effect of treatment and gender on risk-taking 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risky Default 0.0433 0.0445 -0.00211 0.0210 0.0226 -0.0497 
 (0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0678) (0.0513) (0.0512) (0.0678) 
       
Female  -0.0518 -0.104  -0.0563 -0.135** 
  (0.0506) (0.0715)  (0.0509) (0.0681) 
       
Female×Risky Default   0.104   0.159 
   (0.101)   (0.0991) 
       
Constant 0.315*** 0.337*** 0.360*** 0.463*** 0.493*** 0.530*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0418) (0.0473) (0.0732) (0.0783) (0.0802) 
       
Background variables No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Linear combination of    0.102   0.109    
RD and Female×RD   (0.075)   (0.074) 
Observations  354 354 354 354 354 354 
  
Note: The table reports linear regressions of the variable “Risk taking”.  
“Risky Default”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is in the Risky Default treatment.  
“Female”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is female.  
“Female × Risky Default”: interaction between “Female” and “Risky Default”.  
Background variables are age (consisting of four indicator variables: Age below 26, age 27-30, age 31-35 
and age above 36), economic education (consisting of three indicator variables: No economic education, 
1year of economic education, 3 years or more of economic education), “Income below USD 50 000”: 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the participant has a yearly average household income below 
USD 50 000, and “Impatient”: indicator variable taking the value of one if the participant has a score in the 
lower half of the time preference scale (1-4 out of 7).  
Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Regression (6) includes the indication variables for treatment and gender, the interaction 
variable between these two, and control variables. The constant (𝛽0) is 0.530, meaning that 
the average risk-taking for males in the Safe Default Group is 53.0 %. The coefficient for 
Risky Default (𝛽1) is -0.0497 and has a p-value of 0.46, meaning that it is not significantly 
different from zero. This implies that the average increase in risk seeking behavior among 
males in the risky default treatment group compared to the safe default treatment group is 
zero. In other words, males seem to be equally risk seeking irrespective of which treatment 
group they are in. The number of males in the Risky Default Group that is keeping the lottery 
is equal to the number of males in the Safe Default Group that is exchanging the safe payment 
for a lottery.  
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The coefficient for Female (𝛽2) is -0.135, indicating a gender difference in risk-taking of 13.5 
%. This suggests that the average risk-taking for females in the safe default treatment group is 
39.5 %, compared to 53.0 % for males. The p-value of this coefficient is 0.048, meaning that 
the gender gap in risk-taking is statistically significant at the 95 % level, for the Safe Default 
Group. The average increase in risk seeking behavior for females in the Risky Default Group 
compared to females in the Safe Default Group, is 10.9 %, which is the linear combination of 
𝛽1 and 𝛽3. This figure has a p-value of 0.14 for a two-tailed test and 0.07 for a one-tailed test, 
implying that the treatment effect among females in statistically significant at the 90 % level. 
 
The coefficient for Female × Risky Default (𝛽3) represents the interaction effect, which is the 
effect we are most interested in. The value of 𝛽3 is 0.159, and because the value is different 
from zero, there is indications of an interaction effect. The p-value of this coefficient is 0.11, 
suggesting that the interaction effect is not statistically significant. However, because we have 
a hypothesis stating an expectation of a positive interaction effect, we can make use of a one-
tailed t-test instead of a two-tailed t-test. The one-tailed t-test provides a p-value of 0.055. 
This infers that the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 90 % significance level. 
Thus, we have found evidence of a causal relationship between the gender difference in risk-
taking behavior and the gender difference in treatment effect, i.e. default effect. 
 
4.2 Additional analysis: time preference  
 
In this subchapter, we briefly examine another aspect of our results. We test whether the 
default bias is related to time preferences. Being impatient means that you prefer having a 
benefit today, rather than waiting for it and having a greater benefit in the future. In an 
economic context, this implies that you have a higher discount rate. Figure 6 below shows the 
average risk-taking and reported time preference of our sample. Time preference is measured 
on a 7 point scale, with 1 being very impatient and 7 being very patient. In this analysis, time 
preference is converted into an indicator variable, denoted “Impatient”. This variable takes the 
value 1 if the participant has a time preference of 1 to 4, and 0 if the participant has a time 
preference of 5 to 7. The figure displays large differences in risk-taking behavior, with 
impatient individuals being a lot more risk averse than patient ones.  
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The average risk-taking among patient individuals is 38.30 % when exposed to a risky 
default, and 40.50 % when exposed to a safe default. Among these individuals, the difference 
between the two treatment groups is not significantly different from zero (p-value: 0.72). This 
suggests that patient individuals are not affected by the default effect. For the impatient 
individuals we find a different result. In the Safe Default Group, the average risk seeking is 
12.28 %. In the Risky Default Group, this figure is more than doubled to 25.71 %. The 
treatment effect among the impatient individuals is almost statistically significant at the 90 % 
level (p-value: 0.101), when using a two-tailed t-test. 
 
Table 3 below presents the output from the regression analysis. Regression (1) shows that 
impatient individuals are on average 21.9 % more risk averse than patient ones, significant at 
the 99 % level. Regression (2) suggests that the overall treatment effect is less than 2 %, 
implying that when participants are not divided by time preference there is no evidence of a 
default bias. Regression (3) includes the interaction variable of time preference and treatment. 
The linear combination of Impatient and Impatient × Risky Default proposes that impatient 
individuals are 12.6 % more risk seeking when exposed to a risky default compared to a safe 
default. This is consistent with the numbers from figure 6 above. The p-value for the 
interaction variable is 0.17 for a two sided t-test. As we expected to find results similar to 
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those of Heijden et al. (2011), we can make use of a one sided test. The p-value for this test is 
0.09, signifying that the interaction effect is significant at the 90 % level. 
 
Table 3: Regression analysis: Effect of time preference and treatment on risk taking 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Impatient -0.219*** -0.217*** -0.282*** -0.215*** -0.212*** -0.277*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0568) (0.0745) (0.0502) (0.0514) (0.0637) 
       
Risky Default  0.0171 -0.0220  0.0210 -0.0174 
  (0.0498) (0.0575)  (0.0513) (0.0612) 
       
Impatient×Risky   0.156   0.155 
   (0.115)   (0.106) 
       
Constant 0.393*** 0.384*** 0.405*** 0.474*** 0.463*** 0.481*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0393) (0.0422) (0.0682) (0.0732) (0.0749) 
       
Background var. No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes 
Linear combination of  
Imp. and Imp×Risky 
 -0.126   -0.122 
 (0. 088)   (0. 085) 
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354 
 
Note: The table reports linear regressions of the variable “Risk taking”.  
“Impatient”: indicator variable taking the value of one if the participant has a score in the lower half of the 
time preference scale (i.e. a score of 1-4 out of 7).  
“Risky Default”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is in the Risky Default treatment. 
“Impatient × Risky”: interaction between “Female” and “Risky Default”.  
Background variables are age (consisting of four indicator variables: Age below 26, age 27-30, age 31-35 
and age above 36), economic education (consisting of three indicator variables: No economic education, 
1year of economic education, 3 years or more of economic education), and “Income below USD 50 000”: 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the participant has a yearly average household income below 
USD 50 000. Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Regressions (4)-(6) provides the same output as regressions (1)-(3), while controlling for the 
relevant background variables. These regressions suggest that the findings are not altered 
when control variables are included. The size of the interaction effect is 15.5 % and the p-
value is reduced to 0.14 for a two-sided test, and 0.07 for a one-sided test. This suggests that 
there is evidence of impatient individuals being more biased by a default effect, significant at 
the 90 % level. These findings expand the implications of the study by Heijden et al. (2011), 
inferring that impatient individuals not only are more influenced by the nudge used in their 
study, but also by a default nudge, or default effect.  
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In addition to time preference, we looked into the other background variables, to see if we 
could find indications of who is most affected by the default effect. In Chapter A.3 in the 
appendix, we provide an overview of the change in risk-taking between the Safe Default 
Group and the Risky Default Group, based on the background variables. However, when the 
sample is divided in several subgroups, the sample size in each category becomes rather 
small, increasing the risk of unreliable results. We found no results to be significant at the 
same time as the sample size was sufficiently large enough to be reliable. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion  
 
In this study we found evidence of a causal relationship between the gender difference in risk-
taking and the gender difference in default bias. We investigated two separate effects and the 
interaction between them, thereby combining two different literatures. The first effect is the 
gender effect on risk taking. In accordance with our hypothesis, we found indications of a 
gender gap in risk-taking behavior with females being 28.88 % more risk averse than males 
(26.94 % with control variables). The overall gender effect for both treatment groups is 
statistically significant at the 90 % level when using a one-sided t-test (p-value: 0.07). When 
including control variables, the effect is significant at the 95 % level (p-value: 0.04).  
 
Furthermore, the direction of our result indicate evidence of a treatment effect, i.e. a default 
bias. Even though the two treatment groups where exposed to identical choices, with only a 
small change in the question structure, this little twist influenced their behavior. According to 
standard economic theory, this should not have occurred, as people should behave rational 
and consistent regardless of the framing of choices. We found participants to be 11.24 % more 
risk seeking in the Risky Default Group than in the Safe Default Group. However, the 
regression analysis reveals that the overall treatment effect (for both genders) is not 
statistically significant at the 90 % level.  
 
Our most interesting result is found when interacting this treatment effect with gender. When 
dividing our sample by gender, we find a significant treatment effect among females, and no 
evidence of a treatment effect among males. This implies that only females seems to be 
affected by the default bias, while males are equally risk seeking irrespective of the default 
they receive. Moreover, this creates a larger gender gap in risk-taking behavior in the Safe 
Default Group, while in the Risky Default Group the gender gap is not only reduced, but 
completely non-existing. In the latter group, males and females are equally risk seeking. In 
summary, we find that it is possible to influence the gender gap in risk-taking behavior. By 
framing the choice as having a risky default, the gender gap disappears. In other words, we 
found that the choice of default has a causal effect on the gender gap in risk-taking behavior.   
 
In addition to our main analysis, we did a more comprehensive investigation on one of the 
background variables. We examined the relationship between time preference and default 
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bias. Our findings prove that impatient individuals are more influenced by the default effect 
than patient ones, significant at the 90 % level. These results are consistent with our 
expectations and the research of Heijden et al. (2011), who also finds that the decision frames 
of impatient people are affected more easily than those of patient people. This is interesting 
from a policy perspective because people who often are associated with undesirable behaviors 
such as low savings, overspending on credit cards and obesity, are the same people who are 
mostly affected by the default effect. These people are also the target group of many nudges, 
and our findings thus confirms that the target group are those who actually are most 
influences by the default nudge.   
 
In relation to existing literature, our study both confirms and expands prior knowledge. The 
literature on risk-taking behavior is extensive. We found opposing arguments regarding the 
gender gap, depending on the framing of the studies, the control variables included, and other 
factors influencing the results. However, there seem to be more evidence in favor of females 
being more risk averse than males (e.g. Byrnes et al., 1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2011). This 
conclusion is supported by our results, as we also find females to be more risk averse than 
males. 
   
Regarding default bias, there is very little previous research on gender differences. We could 
only find one study touching upon this question, and they found little evidence of a gender 
differences or a default bias at all. Hence, our study provides a contribution to this field. Many 
studies on default options provide evidence that the default effect influence people’s choices. 
Therefore, we expected that both genders would be affected by this bias, although females 
would be more influenced. This is not what our results suggest. We find evidence of a default 
bias among women, although no such evidence was found among males. In other words, we 
found a great gender difference in this bias.  
 
In summary, our findings are largely in compliance with our hypothesis, and because our 
hypothesis is based on results from previous research, this implies that our results are 
consistent with existing literature. We argue that our finding regarding the gender gap in risk-
taking is confirming prior research, while our finding regarding the gender gap in default bias 
is expanding prior research. We have contributed to filling a gap in the literature in the 
intersection between gender differences in risk-taking and default bias. 
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The implications of our study are mainly related to framing of questions. We have 
demonstrated that using a default option as part of the framing will affect the choice of 
females, while men appear unaffected. If it is desirable to make women less risk averse, it will 
be important to consider the framing of the choices. For women, it would be beneficial to be 
aware that one might be affected by defaults and that our choice might be influenced by the 
choice architecture and even small changes in the context. If people are attentive, each 
individual can make a more cautious choice by deliberately evaluating whether it is beneficial 
to go with the default (the recommendation) or to make your own assessment of the option 
set. Actors using defaults should be aware that it might influence different people differently, 
and cause results that differs from their intention. This is particularly important for 
governments and policy makers.  
 
Two alternative hypotheses to why women are more risk averse can be proposed. Firstly, that 
women have different underlying risk preferences than males. Secondly, that choices 
regarding risk often is framed in a setting where the safe option is the default. In this case, the 
gender difference is driven by a greater default bias among females, rather than a greater risk 
aversion. As our findings indicate, the gender difference disappears when the question is 
presented with a risky option as default. With our research design we cannot answer which of 
these hypotheses that are the true one. We end this discussion by stating that more research is 
needed in this field to reveal the true links and mechanisms behind the possibilities of 
affecting people’s risk-taking behavior. Limitations of our study and further suggestions for 
future research will be discussed in the next subchapter.  
 
5.1 Limitations and suggestions for future research  
 
The findings and limitations of our study provide implications for future research. One 
limitation of our study is that using incentivized choices and real money is costly and difficult 
to perform with a large, representative sample (Dohmen et al., 2009). The financial restriction 
of our research implies a tradeoff between substantial incentives and a sufficient sample size. 
As a result, we decided to conduct our experiment with low stakes to be able to obtain a 
satisfactory sample size, at the same time as we adhere to our financial boundaries. Thus, we 
were able to attain an adequate and satisfactory sample size of 354 participants. 
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One potential problem is that experiments with small stakes might not yield conclusions that 
generalize to high stake experiments. In this regard it has been raised concerns about the 
quality of work on mTurk due to the low payment. Mason and Suri (2011) states that mTurk 
can be seen as a market for lemons. “However, there is usually a change in behavior going 
from paying zero to some low amount and little to no change in going from a low amount to a 
higher amount. Thus, the norm on mTurk of paying less than one would typically pay 
laboratory subjects should not impact large classes of experiments” (Mason and Suri, 2011, p. 
9). Other studies have also shown that conclusions from lower stake experiments do 
generalize. As an example, the gender difference in risk-taking is found to be consistent 
across high stake and low stake experiments (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
 
Even though we obtained a satisfactory sample size, the power of our analysis would have 
been improved if we had a lager sample. Ideally the sample would mimic the US population, 
but workers on mTurk are younger and higher educated than the general US population, and 
this was also reflected in our sample. Yet our sample is at least as representative of the 
population (in our case the US population) as samples drawn from traditional subject pools. In 
Appendix A.6 about validity and reliability, strengths and weaknesses of our study is further 
discussed and evaluated. In summary, we find the internal validity to be a strength of our 
study, while the external validity often is perceived as a threat to experimental studies.  
 
The experimental setting is often stated to be artificial or non-realistic (e.g. Mook, 1983). To 
test the robustness and generalizability of our findings there is a need for studies investigating 
the topic further in other contexts (including field experiments), larger samples as well as for 
other populations. In relation to this, it would be interesting to investigate whether a person’s 
true underlying risk preferences can be influenced or whether it is only the more shallow risk-
taking behavior that is affected. Will risk-taking behavior adjust back to the person’s true risk 
preference after the effect of a treatment fades, or would it be possible to affect risk 
preferences permanently? Is there a difference among males and females in this regard? And 
are there only certain stages of a person’s life personality traits like these can be shaped?  
 
Our study leaves many important questions unaddressed, but it provides significant evidence 
of the importance of framing on decision making. Providing a simple default option can alter 
people’s behavior, and the insight from our study suggests that the gender gap in risk-taking 
can be influenced and even eliminated. Hopefully, our finding will create an interest in this 
question and encourage further research on the topic. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Survey in Qualtrics 
 
Introduction 
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project. We very much appreciate your participation. 
This survey is conducted as a part of a master thesis project at the Norwegian School of Economics. 
Participation 
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any time or refuse 
to participate entirely without jeopardy to future participation in other studies conducted by us. 
Confidentiality 
All data obtained from you will be kept confidential and will only be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting 
only combined results and never reporting individual ones). All questionnaires will be concealed, and no one other 
than the primary investigators will have access to them. 
Procedures 
The study will take about 5-6 minutes to complete. Please always make sure to read the instructions carefully. 
Payment 
If you complete the survey, you will be entitled to your participation fee of 1 USD. 
Your participation will be registered on your Amazon Mechanical Turk worker ID. You will not need a completion 
code. Your payment will be paid to you within two weeks after the completion of this HIT. 
Questions about the research 
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact questions.preferencesurvey@gmail.com 
I have read and understood the above consent form and desire to participate in this study. 
Yes 
No 
Amazon Mechanical Turk worker ID 
Please note that your participation will be registered on the following Amazon Mechanical Turk worker ID: 
${e://Field/workerId} 
The worker ID was retrieved automatically when you clicked on the link that brought you here. This step is 
necessary for assigning payments to the right account and to ensure that you only participate in this study once. 
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Instructions 
Instructions 
In the main part of the study, you will be working on a picture categorization task. You will see a picture on your 
screen and are asked to select the categories from the menu below the picture that you think fit to the picture 
and its content. You can select multiple categories from the menu if you think that the picture fits into that 
category as well. 
Your answer will be submitted automatically after 30 seconds and you will be given a new picture. There are 
6 pictures in total. The task will last for 3 minutes in total and we ask you to work thoroughly with each picture. 
Click the button below if you have read and understood the instructions. 
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Picture categorization task 
 
Picture 1: Please select the elements below that best describes the picture: 
People Jungle Warm 
Beach       Boats   Cold 
Forest Mountains Traveling 
Houses  Night Sightseeing 
Cars           Day  Hiking 
Animals Sunny Shopping 
Plants       Rainy Swimming 
Roads Cloudy Eating 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Picture 2: Please select the elements below that best describes the picture: 
People Jungle Warm 
Beach        Boats   Cold 
Forest Mountains Traveling 
Houses       Night Sightseeing 
Cars           Day  Hiking 
Animals Sunny Shopping 
Plants        Rainy Swimming 
Roads Cloudy Eating 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Picture 3: Please select the elements below that best describes the picture: 
People Jungle Warm 
Beach        Boats   Cold 
Forest Mountains Traveling 
Houses  Night Sightseeing 
Cars           Day  Hiking 
Animals Sunny Shopping 
Plants          Rainy Swimming 
Roads Cloudy Eating 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Picture 4: Please select the elements below that best describes the picture: 
People Jungle Warm 
Beach    Boats   Cold 
Forest Mountains Traveling 
Houses  Night Sightseeing 
Cars           Day  Hiking 
Animals Sunny Shopping 
Plants         Rainy Swimming 
Roads Cloudy Eating 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
  
57   . 
 
 
Picture 5: Please select the elements below that best describes the picture: 
People   Jungle Warm 
Beach          Boats   Cold 
Forest Mountains Traveling 
Houses   Night Sightseeing 
Cars                 Day  Hiking 
Animals Sunny Shopping 
Plants         Rainy Swimming 
Roads Cloudy Eating 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds #QuestionText, 
TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Payment 
You have been working on the picture task for 3 minutes. As a reward for completing this work task, you are given 
a lottery ticket that gives you the chance to earn 250 bonus points or 0 bonus points with equal probability. 
The bonus points are converted into USD at a rate of 1 cent per bonus point. 
The bonus points that you have received by the end of this study will be paid to you using the bonus system within 
a few days after the completion of this HIT. Please click on the button to continue. 
You have been working on the picture task for 3 minutes. As a reward for completing this work task, you were 
given a payment of 100 bonus points. 
The bonus points are converted into USD at a rate of 1 cent per bonus point. 
The bonus points that you have received by the end of this study will be paid to you using the bonus system within 
a few days after the completion of this HIT. Please click on the button to continue. 
Possibility to change safe payment to lottery 
Before we continue, you will have the possibility to decide whether you want to keep your payment of 100 
bonus points or whether you want to change it for a lottery ticket. The lottery ticket gives you the chance to 
receive 250 bonus points or 0 bonus points with equal probability. Please indicate your choice below: 
Keep the safe payment 
Exchange the safe payment with a lottery 
Possibility to change lottery to safe payment 
Before we continue, you will have the possibility to decide whether you want to keep your lottery ticket and the 
chance to earn 250 bonus points or 0 bonus points with equal probability or whether you want to exchange it for 
a payment of 100 bonus points. Please indicate your choice below: 
Keep the lottery ticket 
Exchange the lottery ticket with a safe payment 
Time preference 
We now ask for your willingness to act in a certain way. Please indicate your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, where 
1 means you are "completely unwilling to do so" and a 7 means you are "very willing to do so". How willing are 
you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from that in the future? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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5 
6 
7 
 
Demographics 
You have completed most of the survey. We would now like to ask you a few questions about your background 
before we conclude this survey. 
What is your gender? 
Male 
Female 
How old are you? 
Years 
In which of these regions do you usually live? 
Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) 
Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota) 
South (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington D.C., West Virginia, 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) 
West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and 
Washington) 
Other 
What kind of area do you usually live? 
Rural area 
Urban area 
What is your ethnicity? If you belong to several groups, please indicate the one you identify with the most. 
White American 
European American 
Middle Eastern American 
Hispanic American or Latino American 
Black American or African American 
Native American or Alaske Native 
Asian American 
Foreign 
Other 
 
0 
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What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Less than High School 
High School / GED 
Some College 
2-year College Degree 
4-year College Degree 
Masters Degree 
Doctoral Degree 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
Do you have any education within the field of economics? 
No 
Yes, I have taken one or a few courses 
Yes, I have 1-2 years of education within economics or related fields 
Yes, I have 3 or more years of education within economics or related fields 
What is your current occupational situation? 
Employed 
Retired 
Works in own household 
Student 
Freelance or self-employed 
Unemployed 
Other 
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What is your annual household income? 
Below $10,000 USD 
$10,000 - $20,000 USD 
$20,000 - $30,000 USD 
$30,000 - $40,000 USD 
$40,000 - $50,000 USD 
$50,000 - $60,000 USD 
$60,000 - $70,000 USD 
$70,000 - $80,000 USD 
Above $80,000 USD 
Do not know 
What is your marital status? 
Married 
Unmarried partner 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Single 
How many children do you have? 
No children 
1 child 
2 children 
3 children 
4 children 
5 or more children 
Finally, if you have any comments or suggestions related to this study please write them down in the field below. 
Your feedback is important to our study. 
  
 
 
End of survey 
 
Thank you! 
You have successfully finished the survey and we thank you for your participation! 
We will calculate and pay your bonus as soon as this full batch of HITs is finished. It 
generally takes us up to two weeks to match the data and pay out the bonuses. 
Double entries are a problem to us. Please do not try to take this survey again. 
If you have any questions, rather contact us by sending an email to questions.preferencesurvey@gmail.com. 
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A.2 Documentation of experimental procedures  
 
A.2.1 Control variables  
 
The appropriate and necessary control variables was identified by reviewing existing 
literature. We investigated the control variables used in other equivalent studies and reviewed 
the criticism against the studies. Dohmen et al., (2011) find strong evidence that gender, age, 
height, and parental background play an important role in explaining individual differences in 
risk attitudes. In their meta-study from 2008, Eckel and Grossman argue that both field and 
lab studies typically fail to control for knowledge, wealth, marital status and other 
demographic factors that might bias the measures of gender differences in risk-taking 
behavior.   
 
We want to control for knowledge, because there is evidence of the gender difference being 
(at least partly) explained by knowledge (e.g. Dwyer, Gilkeson and List, 2002). We include 
knowledge as a control variable by asking the participants about their level of education. We 
also ask whether they have any education within the field of economics. Furthermore, Sundén 
and Surette (1998) finds that marital status is significantly related to asset allocation, with 
married men and women being more risk averse than single men and women. For this reason, 
we found it interesting to include a question about marital status, to see whether this might 
have an impact. We also include a question about number of children, as this might influence 
risk-taking behavior (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998). Moreover, we ask the participants 
about their ethnic background, as culture also is found to influence the gender gap (e.g. 
Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn and Satterfield, 2000). 
 
A.2.2 Layout 
 
Designing the experiment was an iterative process involving discussions and evaluations of 
everything from the layout and wording to technical details. As we only had one chance to 
carry out the experiment, due to budget constraints, it was crucial to make it right the first 
time. We reviewed an extensive amount of literature to find the best design of similar 
experiments. We also got access to some relevant prior studies conducted by The Choice Lab. 
This was the starting point for our discussions regarding the design. We developed several 
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outlines, and together with helpful guidance and insights from our supervisor and other 
researchers at The Choice Lab, we agreed upon the final design.  
 
We focused on a convenient and tidy layout to facilitate the respondents’ willingness to 
answer. In particular, we focused on the formulation of the instructions and questions to make 
sure the wording was clear, precise and simple. We tried to avoid terminology or concepts 
that could create confusion. In this regard, we evaluated the probable educational level, 
knowledge and cultural background of our intended sample to make sure the tasks and 
questions were understandable. This also ensured that we were effective in our 
communication, so that our intended meaning corresponded with the perceived meaning 
(Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010).  
 
A.2.3 Pre-test 
 
Prior to the experiment, we examined the clarity and the procedures of the experimental 
design by talking to five friends and acquaintances about the design and wording of the 
experiment. This enabled us to be effective in producing the wanted information considering 
our time and budgetary constraints, compared to conducting an incentivized pre-test on a 
smaller sample (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010). The contributors conducted the experiment in 
Qualtrics. After completing the experiment, participants were given a printed transcript of the 
experiment and asked to write down their thoughts.  
 
The participants were asked explicitly about their understanding of the questions and tasks, so 
that we could evaluate our wording.  All the participants were able to complete the tasks and 
answer the questions, indicating that we are efficiently in our communication. The 
participants’ own feedback revealed no confusion about the experiment. Even when asked 
explicitly about their interpretation of different parts, no confusion was uncovered. In addition 
to asking about clarity, we discussed potential ethical issues with the contributors, assuring 
that the experiment is justifiable from an ethical perspective. It can be argued that all people 
to a certain degree are ethical sources and by talking about issues regarding ethics with the 
contributors we can get some insight into how real participants will react.  
 
Sensitivity was a central topic in our pre-test. By sensitivity, we refer to both sensitive 
information, such as social security numbers, and questions about sensitive topics. Examples 
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could be undesirable behavior like shop lifting or not caring about recycling. We asked the 
contributors whether they felt that the experiment and questions where sensitive, and whether 
or not they were easily willing to answer. All the contributors replied that they were not 
reluctant to answer any of the questions, and stated that they did not assess the experiment to 
be sensitive. This seems reasonable considering that the experiment does not ask about topics 
where participants might not want to reveal their true preferences. Facilitating willingness to 
answer is also addressed through the confidentiality assured in the first part of the experiment.    
 
A third and final topic we asked the contributors to assess was the impact of the American 
culture on the questions asked. Here we focused the talk around the meaning and scope of the 
different concepts, ensuring that Americans understand and interpret the questions and tasks 
in the same manner. The contributors did not think that there would be any confusion here. 
The contributors should have some knowledge of the American culture considering that it is a 
part of the western world and that the world has become “smaller”. Two of the contributors 
have lived in the U.S., and two others have traveled there. However, since none of the 
participants where Americans we cannot be sure that we have covered everything in regard to 
culture. 
 
Two of the participants mentioned that they thought the Americans would be more reluctant 
to answer sensitive questions. In this regard, we discussed the questions about income, marital 
status and occupation, and whether we should include an option of “do not want to answer”.   
We were reluctant to include such answer options as they give little value in our analysis. We 
concluded on not including this option as the participants has the possibility to end the study 
if they do not want to provide the requested information.  
 
Furthermore, we discussed how the different backgrounds and levels of education might 
influence the understanding of the questions and the response accuracy. We reached the 
conclusion that the concepts are well explained by the use of structured questions, indirectly 
explained through the various response options. Hence, “the response format should explain 
the concepts so that they are correctly understood and interpreted and thereby encourage 
correct and clear answers” (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010, p. 222).   
 
In addition, we measured the time it took to complete the survey to make sure we had a 
correct estimate of the duration. We were concerned that it would take too long to finish the 
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study compared to our estimated time and that it would demotivate respondents, and make 
them careless about their answers. It took approximately 5-7 minutes for all the contributors 
to conduct the study. This was as expected. We also asked the contributors specifically about 
the time restrictions on the picture task. All of the contributors thought it was enough time, 
and reporter that they did not feel rushed. 
 
To conclude, since there were no discovered problems related to duration, understandability, 
sensitivity, format or culture we used the same layout and procedure later in the main study. 
 
A.2.4 Technical specifications of the experiment  
 
Before the experiment was executed on mTurk, it was ensured that the design of the treatment 
worked. More specifically, that all the participant was allocated evenly and randomly into one 
of the two treatment groups. This was made possible by features in Qualtrics that enabled us 
to create a “randomizer” to randomly allocate participants to one of two groups. In addition, 
one could chose to make the “randomizer” allocate an equal amount of individuals to each 
group, so that it would not be arbitrary how many got allocated to each group. This was 
important to us as an uneven distribution could affect our analysis and results.  
 
To make sure that that the same individuals not conducted the survey more than once, we 
made use of a feature in Qualtrics called “Prevent ballot box stuffing”. This feature places a 
cookie on the participant’s browser when they submit a response. If they try to click on the 
survey link again, this cookie is detected and prohibit the individual from taking the survey. 
However, the participant can avoid this restriction by accessing the survey from different 
browsers. They may do this to try to get paid multiple times or to try to figure out what the 
survey was about. We try to deal with this problem by including the following statement at 
the end of our survey: “Double entries are a problem to us. Please do not try to take this 
survey again. If you have any questions, rather contact us by sending an email to 
questions.preferencesurvey@gmail.com”. We did not experience any problems with double 
entries.  
 
When the survey was closed, the responses in Qualtrics had to be matched with the workers 
on mTurk, to ensure that the participants got the participation fee (1 USD) they were entitled 
to. The participation fee is expected to be paid shortly after the completion of the HIT, so the 
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matching was done the same day. Due to confidentiality and security reasons, the payments 
were done by The Choice Lab, and not by us.  
 
The participants could also earn a bonus in the experiment. To decide the bonus, we had to 
match each participant’s worker ID and assignment ID with his or her response to the 
payment question. If the participant chose the safe payment, he or she would be entitled to a 1 
USD bonus. If the participant chose lottery, we had to decide whether he or she won 2.5 USD 
or nothing. To make this decision fair and truly randomized, we made use of the “Rand()” 
formula in Excel. After listing the bonus to be paid to each participant, the transactions were 
again done by The Choice Lab. 
 
A.2.5 Feedback from participants  
 
During and after the experiment, we assessed the feedback from participants. This was 
provided to us through free text comment boxes both in the Qualtrics survey and on mTurk.  
No boredom or tiredness was reported by any of the participants. This was expected due to the 
short duration and monetary incentives provided. Most participants that made a comment, 
stated that everything was easy to read and understandable and that all the pictures loaded 
well and quickly. However, one participant reported a problem on one of the pictures. 
Another one reported that he/she wanted more time on the picture assignment. Two reported 
that it would have been easier to see and rate the pictures if we had put the categories to the 
right of the picture instead of below. However, this was not feasible as we wanted to make it 
possible to conduct the experiment on all devices, including tablets and phones. Furthermore, 
this should not have any consequences for the result of the study since the picture task has 
nothing to do with the real purpose of the study.  
 
Another participant mentioned that we should have included an additional alternative for the 
question about living area. We only included the options “Rural” and “Urban”. He/she 
suggested to also include “Suburb”. This was a good suggestion and we agree that this would 
have been be smart to include. Regarding drop-out rates and participants taking the survey 
multiple times, we could not detect any problems.  
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A.2.6 Quality assurance   
 
Mason and Suri (2011) states that the downside of using fast and cheap data is the potential of 
low quality. They claim that most workers on mTurk are not primarily motivated by financial 
returns. Still there are a few groups of workers who only care about the financial returns 
without considering their quality of work. These workers are characterized as Spammers. The 
attention level of workers on mTurk has been questioned and is a concern for those using 
mTurk to conduct surveys, experiments and research (Paolacci, 2012).  
  
To identify Spammers in our study and test for the participants’ attention level, we started by 
looking more closely at their answers on the picture categorization tasks (the work task). We 
identified six participants that had three or more none responses, out of the six picture tasks. 
One of these answered that he was zero years. Another participant had a very large variance in 
his answers, four blank picture tasks and 11 and 16 answers on the remaining tasks. In 
addition, he pick categories that was rarely stated by any of the other participants. We could 
not detect any irregularities among his background questions, although it is impossible to tell 
if a participant is being honest on these questions, as all answer options are reasonable.  
 
Furthermore, we looked at irregularities within the remaining sample: If they had picked the 
most common categories or not, if they picked more than 15 categories on the same picture 
tasks, and if they had answered the control questions in a satisfying way. No further 
irregularities were detected and we thereby categorized the six participants who only 
answered two or less of the work tasks as spammers.   
 
Even though we identified six participants to be careless on the picture task this does not 
mean that they were carless on the risk-taking task. This is reasonable to assume because they 
were incentivized on this task. This was verified by testing for the effects of spammers by 
running a t-test without spammers and compare with a t-test including the entire sample. 
There were no significant differences between the groups. The responses were therefore kept 
and included in the subsequent analysis in order to maximize the sample size. Consequently, 
we do not consider these spammers to be jeopardizing the validity of the results.   
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A.3 Ethical considerations  
 
 “It is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure that appropriate steps are taken to conduct 
ethical research” (Mason and Suri, 2011, p. 15). Research should follow some ethical 
guidelines and make sure that respondents are treated in an ethical manner. To ensure ethical 
research we report our findings, methods and instruments accurately and honestly, so that the 
readers can make judgments about the reliability of our findings (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 
2010). In the following sections, we discuss issues related to online experiments in general, 
although our focus will be on issues particularly relevant to the use of mTurk. As the use of 
mTurk is a more resent phenomenon, the related ethical issues are still under debate (Mason 
and Suri, 2011). We want to highlight informed consent, debriefing, restricted populations, 
compensations and confidentiality as central ethical considerations.  
 
A.3.1 Informed consent 
 
To make sure the participants know what they are participating in, we have an information 
page that explains different aspects of the experiment, with a consent question at the bottom 
of the page. This consent allows participation without a written signature (Bryant, Hunton and 
Stone, 2004). Here the subjects are explained the purpose and scope of the experiment. We 
tried to be as honest as possible without revealing too much of the purpose of the experiment. 
This was done deliberately to avoid participation biases. We therefore decided not to inform 
the subject about the main purpose to measure risk-taking behavior.  We still consider the 
provided scope and purpose information to be adequate enough for the subjects to make an 
informed decision.  
 
The information page further describes participation rights, that participation is completely 
voluntarily and that participants can withdraw at any time. It also includes information about 
estimated duration, confidentiality and benefits in the sense of payment.  An email address is 
provided so that the subjects can contact us if they have any questions or comments. With the 
provision of this information subjects should be able to make an informed judgment about 
whether they want to participate or not (Mason and Suri, 2011; “American Psychological 
Association”, 2015; Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010)       
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A.3.2 Debriefing 
 
At the end of the survey, participants are asked to write down comments or suggestions if they 
have any questions or feedback. The use of the comment box provided insight into the 
participants’ reflections regarding the study, helping us to uncover problems in the design, 
and potential high drop-out rates. No further information or debriefing about the purpose of 
the research is stated. We do not consider debriefing to be an important issue regarding our 
research because there are no deceptions (including brand or product crises) or undisclosed 
information in the study (Mason and Suri, 2011). Hence, we do not consider our survey to 
provide any harm, distress or confusion on the participants (“American Psychological 
Association”, 2015; Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010).   
 
A.3.3 Restricted populations  
 
Mechanical Turks policy states that “use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk site is limited to 
persons and entities that lawfully can enter into and form contracts under applicable law. It is 
not intended for use by minors” (“Mechanical Turk”, 2015). This policy is enforced by 
requiring that the payments are linked to verifiable U.S account, making it harder for minors 
to be accepted as workers. Unfortunately, this cannot be entirely avoided because minors can 
use other people’s identity to be accepted as a worker (Mason and Suri, 2011).  
 
A.3.4 Compensation 
 
Ethical consideration regarding compensation on Mechanical Turk is debated due to the low 
wages the workers receive. Workers on Mechanical Turk fall outside the minimum wage laws 
because they are considered “independent contractors”. In defense of mTurk, it could be 
argued that the participation is completely voluntarily, and that the working hours and 
working conditions are decided by the participants themselves (Mason and Suri, 2011). 
Mason and Suri (2011) also states that most workers do not rely on payment from this 
platform as a necessity, which suggest that low payments can be justifiable.  
 
Another argument posed by Mason and Suri (2011, p.16) is that workers on Mechanical Turk 
are self-selected making a “marked for lemons”, and thereby argue that “the equilibrium wage 
is lower than if the requester could more easily check the quality of work before 
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compensating the workers”. Considering this, we decided to reward the participants no lower 
than the standard payment used on the platform.  
 
A.3.5 Confidentiality 
 
Workers on Mechanical Turk are provided a worker ID that does not contain personally 
identifiable information. However, there are some issues regarding the storage of data 
obtained on Mechanical Turk (Mason and Suri, 2011). With the use of this platform, Amazon 
will have access to the data. We avoid this issue by using an external HIT, where the 
responses are stored in Qualtrics rather than on mTurk. The participants in our study are 
ensured confidentiality through the reporting of the result only in an aggregated format (by 
reporting only combined results and never reporting individual ones). Nobody else than the 
primary investigators and those helping us conducting the experiment has access to the data.  
 
By using the worker ID, provided by Amazon, and an assignment ID, which is necessary to 
pay the participants, the information stored cannot be traced back to individuals. The built-in 
payment on mTurk enables us to preserve anonymity at the same time as we provided 
adequate incentives (Duersch et al., 2009; Mason and Suri, 2011). The data gathered does not 
contain name, personal number or any other personal characteristics. The data can neither be 
traced back to an e-mail or an IP-address. In our Qualtrics survey we made sure to activate the 
“anonymize responses” function, so that it would not be possible to track the responses back 
to the participants. 
 
It is not possible for us to link the participants’ answers to their identity through the 
descriptive data because of the general nature of these questions. In summary, we conclude 
that we exclusively register anonymous information and satisfy confidentiality policies 
outlined by “Personvernombudet” 8 (Personvernombudet for forskning, 2015).  We will only 
use the data for the purpose that we have stated and we will be careful regarding the storage 
of data. From the workers perspective, a guarantee of anonymous treatment of responses will 
be reassuring and may influence the participant to take the survey seriously. This will 
hopefully encourage participants to provide genuine data, which is crucial for our research 
(Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010).     
                                                     
8 «Personvernombudet» is part of the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, and is responsible for monitoring 
the privacy policies on behalf of the research industry of Norway (Personvernombudet, 2015). 
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A.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
Gender 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Male   
 
199 55% 
2 Female   
 
161 45% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Time preference 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 1   
 
3 1% 
2 2   
 
6 2% 
3 3   
 
18 5% 
4 4   
 
65 18% 
5 5   
 
121 34% 
6 6   
 
83 23% 
7 7   
 
64 18% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Geography* 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Northeast    
 
60 17% 
2 Midwest    
 
93 26% 
3 South    
 
148 41% 
4 West    
 
58 16% 
5 Other  
 
1 0% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Urban 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Rural area   
 
138 38% 
2 Urban area   
 
222 62% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Ethnicity  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 White American   
 
287 80% 
2 European American   
 
13 4% 
3 Middle Eastern American  
 
0 0% 
4 Hispanic or Latin American   
 
13 4% 
5 Black Am. or African Am.   
 
20 6% 
6 Native Am. or Alaske Native   
 
4 1% 
7 Asian American   
 
21 6% 
8 Foreign  
 
0 0% 
9 Other   
 
2 1% 
 Total  360 100% 
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Education 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Less than High School   
 
3 1% 
2 High School / GED   
 
54 15% 
3 Some College   
 
96 27% 
4 2-year College Degree   
 
42 12% 
5 4-year College Degree   
 
135 38% 
6 Masters Degree   
 
27 8% 
7 Doctoral Degree  
 
1 0% 
8 Professional Degree (JD, MD)  
 
2 1% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Eco_education 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
220 61% 
2 Yes, I have taken one or a few courses   
 
113 31% 
3 
Yes, I have 1-2 years of education 
within economics or related fields 
  
 
14 4% 
4 
Yes, I have 3 or more years of education 
within economics or related fields 
  
 
13 4% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Occupation 
# Answer   Response % 
1 Employed   
 
222 62% 
2 Retired   
 
5 1% 
3 Works in own household   
 
19 5% 
4 Student   
 
12 3% 
5 Freelance or self-employed   
 
73 20% 
6 Unemployed   
 
26 7% 
7 Other   
 
3 1% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Income 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Below $10,000 USD   
 
19 5% 
2 $10,000 - $20,000 USD   
 
47 13% 
3 $20,000 - $30,000 USD   
 
66 18% 
4 $30,000 - $40,000 USD   
 
54 15% 
5 $40,000 - $50,000 USD   
 
40 11% 
6 $50,000 - $60,000 USD   
 
32 9% 
7 $60,000 - $70,000 USD   
 
31 9% 
8 $70,000 - $80,000 USD   
 
20 6% 
9 Above $80,000 USD   
 
50 14% 
10 Do not know  
 
1 0% 
 Total  360 100% 
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Marital status 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Married   
 
143 40% 
2 Unmarried partner   
 
52 14% 
3 Divorced   
 
21 6% 
4 Widowed  
 
1 0% 
5 Single   
 
143 40% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
Children 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No children   
 
213 59% 
2 1 child   
 
55 15% 
3 2 children   
 
48 13% 
4 3 children   
 
29 8% 
5 4 children   
 
10 3% 
6 5 or more children   
 
5 1% 
 Total  360 100% 
 
*Geography: The four regions are explained below with all states included in each region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania 
Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota 
South: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, Washington D.C., West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas 
West: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, 
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington 
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A.5 Risk-taking based on treatment and background variables  
 
 
 
Geography Risky default  Safe default 
Northeast (16.67 %) 35.71 % risk seeking (n: 28) 22.58 % risk seeking (n: 31) 
Midwest (25.71%) 30.23 % risk seeking (n: 43)  29.17 % risk seeking (n: 48) 
South (40.96 %) 38.57 % risk seeking (n: 70)  36.00 % risk seeking (n: 75)  
West (16.38 %) 37.14 % risk seeking (n: 35)  34.78 % risk seeking (n: 23)  
Other (0.28 %) - (n: 0)  0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1) 
 
 
 
Living area Risky default Safe default 
Rural (38.98 %) 33.85 % risk seeking (n: 2) 32.88 % risk seeking (n: 1) 
Urban (61.02 %) 36.94 % risk seeking (n: 3)  30.48 % risk seeking (n: 3) 
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40%
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20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Rural (38.98 %) Urban (61.02 %)
Risk-taking based on treatment and living area
Risky nudge Safe nudge
 .   76 
 
 
 
Ethnicity Risky default Safe default 
White American (79.66 %) 33.58 % risk seeking (n: 137) 30.34 % risk seeking (n: 145) 
European American (3.67 %) 37.50 % risk seeking (n: 8)  20.00 % risk seeking (n: 5) 
Hispanic or Latino (3.39 %) 66.67 % risk seeking (n: 6)  66.67 % risk seeking (n: 6)  
Black or African Am. (5.65 %) 50.00 % risk seeking (n: 10)  30.00 % risk seeking (n: 10)  
Native Am. or Alaska (1.13 %) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 2)  0.00 % risk seeking (n: 2)  
Asian American (5.93 %) 33.33 % risk seeking (n: 12) 44.44 % risk seeking (n: 9)  
Other (0.56 %) 100.00 % risk seeking (n: 1) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1)  
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Education Risky default Safe default 
Less than High School (0.85 %) - (n: 0) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 3) 
High School / GED (14.41 %) 20.83 % risk seeking (n: 24)  44.44 % risk seeking (n: 27) 
Some College (26.55 %) 26.00 % risk seeking (n: 50)  18.18 % risk seeking (n: 44)  
2-year College Degree (11.58 %) 47.83 % risk seeking (n: 23)  38.89 % risk seeking (n: 18)  
4-year College Degree (38.14 %) 46.27 % risk seeking (n: 67)  33.82 % risk seeking (n: 68)  
Master’s Degree (7.63 %) 27.27 % risk seeking (n: 11) 37.50 % risk seeking (n: 16)  
Doctoral Degree (0.28 %) - (n: 0) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1)  
Professional Degree (0.56 %) 0.00 % risk seeking (n:1) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1)  
 
 
 
Economic education Risky default Safe default 
No (60.45 %) 34.34 % risk seeking (n: 99) 24.35 % risk seeking (n: 115) 
One or a few courses (31.92 %) 39.66 % risk seeking (n: 58)  45.45 % risk seeking (n: 55) 
1-2 years of education (3.95 %) 10.00 % risk seeking (n: 10)  25.00 % risk seeking (n: 4)  
3 years or more (3.67 %) 55.56 % risk seeking (n: 9)  50.00 % risk seeking (n: 4)  
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Occupation Risky default Safe default 
Employed (61.86 %) 30.91 % risk seeking (n: 110) 31.19 % risk seeking (n: 109) 
Retired (1.41 %) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1)  25.00 % risk seeking (n: 4) 
Works in own household (5.37 %) 33.33 % risk seeking (n: 9)  40.00 % risk seeking (n: 10)  
Student (3.39 %) 12.50 % risk seeking (n: 8)  25.00 % risk seeking (n: 4)  
Freelance /self-employed (19.77 %) 54.05 % risk seeking (n: 37)  27.27 % risk seeking (n: 33)  
Unemployed (7.34 %) 50.00 % risk seeking (n: 10) 43.75 % risk seeking (n: 16)  
Other (0.85 %) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 2)  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Employed
(61.86 %)
Retired
(1.41 %)
Works in own
household (5.37
%)
Student
(3.39 %)
Freelance/
self-employed
(19.77 %)
Unemployed
(7.34 %)
Risk-taking based on treatment and occupation
Risky nudge Safe nudge (%)
  
79   . 
 
 
 
Income Risky default Safe default 
Below $10,000 USD (5.37 %) 33.33 % risk seeking (n: 6) 46.15 % risk seeking (n: 13) 
$10,000 - $20,000 USD (12.99 %) 45.83 % risk seeking (n: 24)  31.82 % risk seeking (n: 22) 
$20,000 - $30,000 USD (18.08 %) 17.24 % risk seeking (n: 29) 42.86 % risk seeking (n: 35)  
$30,000 - $40,000 USD (15.25 %) 41.38 % risk seeking (n: 29)  32.00 % risk seeking (n: 25)  
$40,000 - $50,000 USD (11.30 %) 45.00 % risk seeking (n: 20)  15.00 % risk seeking (n: 20)  
$50,000 - $60,000 USD (9.04 %) 42.86 % risk seeking (n: 14) 16.67 % risk seeking (n: 18)  
$60,000 - $70,000 USD (7.91 %) 23.53 % risk seeking (n: 17) 36.36 % risk seeking (n: 11)  
$70,000 - $80,000 USD (5.65 %) 58.33 % risk seeking (n: 12)  50.00 % risk seeking (n: 8) 
Above $80,000 USD (14.12 %) 28.00 % risk seeking (n: 25)  24.00 % risk seeking (n: 25) 
Do not know (0.28 %) -  (n: 0)  0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1) 
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Marital status Risky default Safe default 
Married (40.11 %) 32.88 % risk seeking (n: 73) 28.99 % risk seeking (n: 69) 
Unmarried partner (14.12 %) 37.50 % risk seeking (n: 24)  30.77 % risk seeking (n: 26) 
Divorced (5.93 %) 53.85 % risk seeking (n: 13)  50.00 % risk seeking (n: 8)  
Widowed (0.28 %) - (n: 0)  0.00 % risk seeking (n: 1)  
Single (39.55%) 34.85 % risk seeking (n: 66)  32.43 % risk seeking (n: 74)  
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Children Risky default Safe default 
No children (0.85 %) 33.98 % risk seeking (n: 103) 33.65 % risk seeking (n: 104) 
1 child (1.69 %) 53.85 % risk seeking (n: 26)  31.03 % risk seeking (n: 29) 
2 children (5.08 %) 34.62 % risk seeking (n: 26)  27.27 % risk seeking (n: 22)  
3 children (18.36 %) 26.67 % risk seeking (n: 15)  35.71 % risk seeking (n: 14)  
4 children (33.90 %) 33.33 % risk seeking (n: 3)  14.29 % risk seeking (n: 7)  
5 or more children (23.16 %) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 3) 0.00 % risk seeking (n: 2)  
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A.6 Validity and reliability  
 
A valid and reliable research design is important to enhance the trustworthiness of our results 
and reduce the possibility of errors in our research (Saunders et al., 2009). In this section, we 
assess how reliable and valid our research is, in order to evaluate the quality of our study. The 
objective is to minimize the amount of error so that our data provide a more accurate 
reflection of the truth (Litwin, 1995). Simultaneously, we will evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of our study. We will first discuss and evaluate four categories of validity, namely 
internal-, external- construct- and statistical conclusion validity. Thereafter, we will assess the 
reliability of our experiment.  
 
A.6.1 Validity  
 
A.6.1.1 Internal Validity 
 
Internal validity is concerned with the causal relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010). Thus, internal validity is concerned with 
whether or not the results imply what they are intended to predict (Ringdal, 2009). As our 
data is based on an online experiment, as opposed to laboratory testing, there may be variables 
influencing the dependent variable (risk taking) that is not in our control. In this regard, it has 
been argued that the environmental characteristics are more variable (Saunders, et al., 2009). 
This includes the technical aspects of the equipment, noise and lighting (Dandurand et al., 
2008).  
 
Online experiments may also be more prone to adverse effects of distractions. It is likely that 
participants get sidetracked more easily or have been working on other tasks simultaneously 
while conducting an experiment online. This can contribute to decreased accuracy 
(Dandurand et al., 2008; Mason and Suri, 2011). However, as this may be true for more 
extensive studies that have higher demands for concentration, cognitive capacity and 
attention, this is likely not to be a substantial threat in a simple, short and incentivized 
experiment (Dandurand et al., 2008).  
 
Another possible threat that might influence the quality of the results is the prevalence of 
spammers on mTurk (see Appendix A.2.6 about Quality assurance) (Mason and Suri, 2011). 
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These workers are, however, probably not careless on the risk-taking task, due to the fact that 
this task is incentivized. Hence, we do not consider this to be a problem on the obtained 
results. In addition to this, it can be argued that mTurk is less inclined to have spammers in 
their subject pool, than other crowdsourcing sites, due to a built-in reputation system for 
workers (Mason and Suri, 2011).       
 
A substantial threat to internal validity is the possibility of multiple submissions (Dandurand 
et al., 2008). With the use of an external HIT, the threat of multiple submissions is 
problematic because participants only need to change their browser to submit a new survey 
(see section A.2.4). We tried to prevent this by including a request not to participate more 
than once. This might have mitigated the problem although we cannot be sure that it has 
eliminated it (Bryant et al., 2004; Mason and Suri, 2011). 
 
It could also be specific events (history) occurring prior to or during the experiment, or high 
drop-out of the experiment affecting the results (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010; Bryant et al., 
2004; Dandurand et al., 2008; Mason and Suri, 2011). Because the data is cross-sectional, i.e. 
the data is gathered in a certain point in time (1-2 hours), history effects are not a major threat. 
Experimental mortality becomes a threat to internal validity when there is something special 
about participants dropping out of the experiment as compared to those that complete the 
study. This could therefore create a participant self-selection bias that rivals the explanation 
for the observed finding. (Bryant et al., 2004). Even though we are incapable of detecting 
drop-outs, we do not consider drop-out rates to be a large problem in our study. This is mainly 
due to the fact that our survey is incentivized and that the participants do not receive payment 
unless they complete the survey (Mason and Suri, 2011). Providing contact information for 
questions and pre-testing of instructions may also have reduced drop-outs (Mason and Suri, 
2011). 
 
An online experiment may be less inclined to diffusion and imitation of treatments. The 
higher probability of a more geographically disbursed population should make it harder for 
one participant in the treatment group to learn information intended only for those in the other 
treatment group (diffusion). Online experiment should also be less inclined to have 
participants in one treatment condition imitating those in the other treatment condition 
(imitation). Facilitating this is the build in control of hiding the browser back button, which 
prevents participants to go back and change their answers. Including the picture assignment as 
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“warm-up” task should also reduce the adverse effects of drop-out due to the fact that drop-
outs should occur before the random assignment to conditions (Dandurand et al., 2008; Bryant 
et al., 2004). 
 
On the other hand, the targeted population on mTurk seems to be interacting online through 
the use of communities, where they share information and opinions with each other (Schmidt, 
2015; Paolacci, 2012). It is also possible that workers learn from their nearest network of 
friends about this platform, making interaction among mTurk workers more likely. Paolacci 
(2012), however, finds this to not be a critical issue on mTurk and conclude that cross-talk 
hardly can contribute substantially to participant non-naivety. In this regard, it is also unlikely 
that participants have had time to communicate due to the fact the study was just accessible 
for around two hours. In relation to this, it is important to note that participants recruited 
could have conducted experiments that are conceptually or methodologically related to our 
experiment. With the possibility of conduction an unlimited number of experiments, this 
could have a negative impact on quality or accuracy of our survey results (Paolacci, 2012; 
Schmidt, 2015).      
       
By the use of two treatment groups and by randomization we can investigate the relative 
effects. We should thereby be able to remove the possibility of systematic differences 
between the groups, preventing third factors distorting the effect of gender on risk-taking (i.e. 
the only different between the two groups are the treatments). This is further strengthened by 
testing for control variables. The direction and causality between gender and risk is also 
verified by the extensive literature search. With this, threats to internal validity should be 
minimized and we should be well suited to draw a causal conclusion from the obtained 
correlation among variables. Thus we consider the internal validity of our research to be 
strong (Saunders et al., 2009).   
 
A.6.1.2 External Validity  
 
External validity refers to whether the findings can be generalized beyond the particular study 
at hand, to other contexts, populations or periods in time (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010; 
Saunders et al., 2009). The use of an online experiment strengthens the external validity 
because it is carried out in a more natural decision making environment compared to a 
laboratory experiment (Vinogradov and Shadrina, 2013). Comparative advantages in this 
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sense are no pressure of an artificial laboratory environment, taking the experiment whenever 
is convenient, less time pressure and possibly greater work life balance, imposing less stress 
and more comfort on participants (Bryant et al., 2004). Thus, online experiments can be done 
in a wider array of contexts, not just in the highly concentrated context of the laboratory 
(Dandurand et al., 2008).   
  
Using mTurk as a sampling frame further enables us to select from a larger, more 
heterogeneous population than we otherwise would be able to reach (Bryant et al., 2004; 
Duersch et al., 2009). It allows us to have a more diverse population with varying age and 
socioeconomic status, living in different geographical regions. This broadens the sample 
beyond the standard subject pools (Rademacher and Lippke, 2007; Dandurand et al., 2008). 
The use of mTurk as the sampling frame should therefore increase the generalizability of the 
results compared to our alternative which was undergraduate students at our university.  
 
To be able to draw general conclusions, it is critical that the sample is representative of the 
population it is supposed to predict an effect on. Whether our findings can be generalized to 
other countries that may differ in terms of resources, labor conditions, culture and traditions is 
difficult to predict. It is more likely that the findings can be generalized to other western 
cultures. More importantly, we want to assess whether the results can generalize to the 
American population. The fact that we use a non-probability, self-selection sampling 
technique and mTurk as a sampling frame might make generalizability more difficult.  
 
Furthermore, participants who previously have conducted experiments from The Choice Lab 
can choose to get a notice when The Choice Lab post new surveys, making us prone to an 
even higher  selection bias. Another source of selection bias can be drop-outs, as mentioned in 
the section about internal validity. As elaborated upon in section 3.2.4 about our sample, our 
sample is younger, more male dominated, higher educated and includes less ethnic minorities 
than the general US population. Thus the sample is rather similar to the American population, 
although not perfectly representative. We can thereby not be sure that participants 
systematically differ from non-participants.  
 
If our findings can be generalized to other situations or periods in time is difficult to say. The 
experimental setting is often criticized to be artificial or unrealistic, advocating low 
applicability to other situations (e.g. Mook, 1983). The time between treatment and 
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measurement could also have an impact. The amount of time passing from one is exposed to 
the default to the choice regarding risk-taking is made is minimal. It is not certain how the 
default effect will unfold over time. Studies investigating such cases might find other results. 
However, compared to a traditional sampling we consider our external validity to be 
satisfying and at least as applicable to the American population. This can also be reasonably 
inferred from the demographics profile of the obtained sample.  
 
A.6.1.3 Construct Validity  
 
Construct validity addresses the concern of establishing the correct operational measures for 
the concepts being studied. (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010). Ghauri and Grønhaug (2010) 
highlight three characteristics or sources to construct validity. With our use of only one 
indicator for each concept, neither convergent nor discriminant validity can be assessed. 
However, we asses face validity to be strong in our study considering that we have consulted 
literature and our supervisor, assuring that the measure used seems to be reasonable for what 
we intend to measure (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010).  
  
Misinterpretation of concepts and terms used in the study is further minimized due to 
thoroughly assessing the wording and instruction used. Clarity was also stressed by focusing 
on this in the pre-test, and verified by the obtained feedback from the participants (see section 
A.2.5). Another possible threat to validity is the test effect (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2010). 
Sometimes, the experiment itself and the fact that the workers answers are being reported 
have an effect on their provided answers. This is called the Hawthorne effect (Landsberger, 
1958). The Hawthorne effect also addresses the issue of people tending to alter their answers 
to how they think the researchers want them to answer. Nevertheless, this effect should be 
reduced because we explicitly assure the participants that everything is confidential. The 
“naturalism” of online experiments may also increase construct validity by decreasing 
demand effects and other experimenter influences. In this regard, it has been argued that 
participants online are less prone to altering their answers due to not meeting with 
experimenter(s) personally (Dandurand et al. 2008). Furthermore, the pre-testing of the 
experiment helps to avoid leading and charged questions.  
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A.6.1.4 Statistical Conclusion Validity  
 
Statistical conclusion validity is the extent to which conclusions drawn about effects or causal 
relations is reflecting a true effect in the population or whether they are simply due to random 
events (Bryant et al., 2004). To prove statistical conclusion validity we assess our study’s 
statistical power, significant testing and effect size. 
 
As mentioned in the subchapter about power calculations, statistical power is a function of 
sample size, population effect size and α error. An increase in statistical conclusion validity is 
possible through the availability of a larger sample size (Mason and Suri, 2011). With the use 
of internet data collection we get a substantially larger sample size than we otherwise would 
be able to obtain. This increases our study’s statistical power in comparison to our best 
possible alternative.  
 
The larger sample size also lowers the likely error in generalizing to the larger population. 
The sample is more likely to be representative of the population from which they are drawn 
and, in particular, “the mean calculated for the sample is more likely to equal the mean for the 
population” (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 218). On the other hand, our obtained sample size is not 
optimal taking power calculations into consideration. The distribution of the sample among 
men and women and the two treatments further narrows the sample. As this sample is 
relatively small, the risk of committing a Type II9 error increases. In turn this might lead to 
non-significant results. Thus, if the sample where larger we would probably have obtained 
results with higher significance due to the higher possibility of detecting small effects in data.    
 
Another threat to statistical power is the distinction between men and women. This could 
result in an uneven sample size, where one of the groups has a significant larger sample than 
the other. In our sample there is some unevenness in the groups. This unevenness is not 
optimal but should not be large enough to be significant. However, with a small and uneven 
sample size, even when assigning the participants randomly, there is a higher possibility that 
the detected effects can be attributed to differences in the composition of the two groups.  
 
                                                     
9  “Conclude that something is not true, when in reality it is” by accepting the null hypothesis (Saunders, et al. 
2009, p. 452) 
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Furthermore, if the sample size is too small, possible outliers would have too much influence 
on the data, resulting in spurious results (Wooldridge, 2014). This occurs if the population 
from which the sample is drawn is not normally distributed. However, since our population in 
each gender category is above 30, the sampling distribution for the mean should be close to a 
normal distribution (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
In an online experiment the more “natural” or heterogeneous experimental setting may 
decrease statistical conclusion validity by increasing random error. When the sample is 
relatively heterogonous, as opposed to the classic student sample, it is more prone to variance 
caused by uncontrolled factors. As discussed above this “natural” setting can have a positive 
impact on the construct- and external validity. Hence, there is a tradeoff between a larger 
sample obtained through the use of online experiments and increased noise from lessened 
control over data collection. The question here is if the larger sample size reduces beta error 
sufficiently to compensate for the increase in noise.  
 
An increase in statistical conclusion validity is obtained through minimizing random human 
data entry and transcription errors. As opposed to paper-and-pencil experiments, our study 
prevents participants from entering invalid responses by a build in control. The data is 
immediately downloaded to STATA which minimize transcript errors. Furthermore, the build 
in control for restricted time, drop-outs and forced answering prevents challenges with 
incomplete experiments that possibly could have rendered the obtained sample size (Bryant et 
al., 2004).    
 
When it comes to significance testing, it is important to select the appropriate statistical tests 
for testing significance as well as specifying an appropriate significance level. The significant 
level can be defined as specifying the acceptable level of risk for rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it is in fact true (Type I error) (Saunders et al., 2009). We have used t-tests and linear 
multiple regressions as statistical tests. These are widely used and considered to be 
appropriate for significance testing.  
 
Regarding the significance level we only found results that where significant at the 10 % 
level. This is a less stringent significant level than the widely used and accepted level of 5 %. 
This will increase the risk that we have committed type I errors, but decrease the risk that we 
have committed a type II errors. A factor that may violate statistical conclusion validity is 
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measurement error. As mentioned in the section about construct validity, we have used 
measurements that already have been applied in previous research. This should therefore not 
threaten the statistical conclusion validity of our study. We consider the conclusion validity in 
our results to be acceptable.   
 
A.6.2 Reliability  
 
Reliability refers to the stability of the results, and relates to the consistency of the research 
(Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010). If the research is conducted again with the same measurement 
instruments and under the same conditions, the same results should be revealed. This implies 
that the study is reliable when random errors are removed (Ringdal, 2009).  
 
A distinction is made between internal reliability and external reliability. Since we only use 
one item to measure one construct we are only going to address the issue of external 
reliability (Bryman and Cramer, 2009). External reliability of a study refers to the consistency 
of the measures over time (Bryman and Cramer, 2009). If the same respondents will respond 
the same to the same measurements at a later point in time, the external reliability is high. 
According to Saunders et al., (2009) there are four threats to external reliability; participant 
error, participant bias, observer error and observer bias.  
 
Firstly, when it comes to observer bias we have minimized this by using closed questions 
which avoids subjective interpretation. In addition to this, we also avoid possible errors due to 
manually plotting of the data as the data were directly imported from Qualtrics into STATA. 
STATA also helps us to conduct automatic calculations. Further, the use of the software 
Qualtrics and conducting the experiment online facilitated uniformity of the study among 
participants (Dandurand et al., 2008). By including a forced response function in Qualtrics we 
also prevent respondents from submitting incomplete responses. This high level of structure 
should minimize observer errors.  
 
We tried to eliminate participant error by choosing a “neutral” time of the day and the week. 
Participants on mTurk tend to be working most between Tuesday and Saturday. The time of 
the day when most workers are active is between 6 am and 3 pm (Mason and Suri, 2011). Our 
study was conducted in the middle of this period, namely on a Thursday. To make the survey 
available around noon in the US, we posted the survey in the afternoon in Norway. This was 
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also done to assure that the study was accessible at a convenient time and that a substantial 
part of the American population was awake, which also impacts the generalization of the 
results. We further tried to avoid participant errors by formulating the questions and 
instructions in the experiment carefully. 
 
Participant bias may occur if respondents adapt their answers according to what they believe 
is the “correct” answer or what they believe the researcher is looking for. We tried to limit 
this by securing anonymity and by not directly informing the participants about the objective 
of the study. This issue was discussed more thoroughly in section about construct validity.  
 
Based on the arguments and discussions in this subchapter, we evaluate the reliability of our 
study to be good. We have reported the exact procedure of our research as this provides the 
opportunity to replicate the research to verify the results (see Appendix A.2 for 
documentation). Hence, the measures used should be reliable to use for future research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
